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INTERSELLER PRICE VERIFICATION AND HARD BARGAINING:
RECONCILIATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT, ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT, AND THE FORCES OF COMPETITION.
I. INTRODUCTION
Time has not erased the fundamental inconsistencies inherent in the
Robinson-Patman Act.' A product of the 1930's when a slowly recovering
economy remained shaken by severely depressed prices, 2 the statute is mis-
placed in the oligopolistic markets of modern America which tend to maintain
artificially high price levels. 3 The Robinson-Patman Act's broad prohibition of
price discrimination has been widely described as anticompetitive 4 and an-
tithetical to the Sherman Act.5 Yet, despite repeated calls for its reform or
repeal, 6 the Robinson-Patman Act remains the law, 7 and courts can only hope
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1970). The provisions of the Act are highlighted in pt. II infra.
2. See U.S. Department of Justice Report on the Robinson-Patman Act 150-51 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 Justice Dep't Report].
3. See Campbell & Emanuel, A Proposal for a Revised Price Discrimination and Predatory
Pricing Statute, 13 Harv. J. Legis. 125, 132 & n.37 (1975); Note, Meeting Competition Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1476, 1480-81 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Meeting
Competition]. There are also indications that the American economy is becoming predominantly
oligopolistic. Increased management emphasis on market share has caused marginally profitable
sellers to withdraw from various markets, thereby increasing industrial concentration. Position
Wanted, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
In addition to being artificially high, prices in an oligopolistic market are generally inflexible. A
price cut would only be matched by other sellers and result in lower profits for all. See F.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 147 (1970); text accompanying
notes 131-33 infra. But see Flexible Pricing, Business Wetk, Dec. 12, 1977, at 78 (suggesting that
sluggish demand and increased competition from imports have forced companies to price
flexibly).
4. Some forms of price discrimination are procompetitive. Sporadic or temporary price
discrimination is a process whereby oligopolists secretly grant discounts to selected customers in
order to obtain extra business. As this process spreads throughout an oligopolistic market, it will
eventually result in a widespread price cut from the artificially high price level. See R. Posner,
The Robinson-Patman Act 12-15 (1976); Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1481-82. Despite
the procompetitive effect of sporadic price discrimination, it nevertheless falls within the
Robinson-Patman Act's ban of price discrimination.
A partial list of commentary on the anticompetitive effect of the statute includes: R. Posner,
supra at 34-49; 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 37-74; Anonymous, Eine Kleine
Juristische Schlummergeschichte, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1966); Campbell & Emanuel, supra note
3, at 131-55; Levi, The Robinson-Patman Act-Is It in the Public Interest?, 1 A.B.A. Section of
Antitrust Law 60, 61-62 (1952).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. 1975).
6. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 4, at 49-53 (repeal); 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note
2, at 261 (repeal), 276-93 (proposal of a revised statute); Report of the White House Task Force
on Antitrust Policy, app. C (1968), reprinted in 1 J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 631, 753-78
(1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Neal Report] (proposal of a revised statute); Campbell & Emanuel,
supra note 3, at 189-218 (proposal of a revised statute); Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and
Antitrust Policy: A Time for Reappraisal, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1966) (call for reform by a
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to work the least competitive damage possible under this "singularly opaque
and elusive statute." 8 This Comment will examine the judicial treatment of a
classic illustration of the inconsistency between the Sherman Act and the
Robinson-Patman Act-discussion of prices among competing sellers in order
to verify customer reports of the availability of better offers from other
sellers. 9
The problem originates in the "meeting competition" defense of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The statute prohibits sellers from discriminating in
price among purchasers of goods of like grade and quality,10 but exempts
discrimination "made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor."'" Courts have interpreted the good faith element as requiring a
seller to have specific and reliable reports of a competitor's lower price before
he can discriminate in price, 12 for the buyer himself is viewed as inherently
unreliable because of his desire to obtain the best deal possible.1 3 The buyer
Federal Trade Commissioner); Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 Antitrust L.J. 18 (1976)- Contra,
Cohen, Let's Retain It, 45 Antitrust L.J. 44 (1976); see E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer
309-14 (1970).
7. The Robinson-Patman Act is likely to remain the law for at least the immediate future See
F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 551 & n.69 (1962) The statute's
protectionist attitude towards small businessmen has traditionally drawn strong support in
Congress, making repeal or reform politically inexpedient. In urging passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act, its cosponsor stated: "This bill has the opposition of all cheaters, chiselers. bribe
takers, bribe givers, and the greedy who seek monopolistic powers which would destroy
opportunity for all young people and which would eventually cause Government ownership, as
the people of this country will not tolerate private monopoly.
"The bill has the support of those who believe that competition is the life of trade, that the
policy of live and let live is a good one; that it is one of the first duties of Government to protect
the weak against the strong and prevent men from injuring one another, that greed should be
restrained and the Golden Rule practiced." 80 Cong. Rec. 3447 (1936) (remarks of Rep Patman)
Subsequently, subcommittees of the House Small Business Committee have continued to support
the statute. See, e.g., Report of the Special Subcomm. on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1970). The latest subcommittee has
also opposed revision of the statute. See [1976] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BAN) No. 784, A-19
to-20.
Perhaps the best way of dislodging congressional support for the Robinson-Patman Act is to
establish that it does not, in fact, benefit the small businessman. See, e.g., 1977 Justice Dep't
Report, supra note 2, at 75-100, 181-209; Kuenzel & Schiffres, Making Sense of Robinson.
Patman: The Need To Revitalize Its Affrmative Defenses, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1211, 1215-17 (197b).
8. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530 (1963) (Harlan, J.. dissenting).
9. See generally Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 3, at 143-49; Eaton, The Robinson-Patman
Act: Reconciling the Meeting Competition Defense with the Shermian Act, 18 Antitrust Bull. 411
(1973); Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1240-44; LaRue, Meeting Competition or Price-
Fixing? Appearances Are Often Deceiving, 54 Chi. B. Rec. 335 (1973), Meeting Competition,
supra note 3; Note, Antitrust Liability for an Exchange of Price Infornation-What Happened to
Container Corporation?, 63 Va. L. Rev. 639, 663-66 (1977) [hereinafter cited as llhat Happened].
10. See text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
12. See pt. mI(A) infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 71-94 infra.
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may even have lied about competing offers in the past. 14 Therefore, a seller
cannot cut his price simply on the basis of the buyer's report of a competing
offer; he must attempt to verify the buyer's report.Is
If the seller has been unable to verify the buyer's report, the seller has four
options, none of which is attractive. Before cutting his price to the buyer, the
seller could verify the reported price with a competitor, the ultimate source of
specific and reliable information as to a competing price. 1 6 This verification
would satisfy the good faith requirement of the meeting competition defense,
enabling the seller to defend successfully a price discrimination charge. Such
interseller price verification may, however, fall within the ambit of section I
of the Sherman Act, which has been interpreted as prohibiting exchanges of
specific price information among competitors where the effect of such an
exchange is to stabilize prices.17
The seller's second option is to lower his price to the customer reporting the
lower price without verifying the report with his competitor. But in these
circumstances the seller could not raise a meeting competition defense to a
price discrimination charge. By cutting his price on the basis of an unverified
report, he has not acted in good faith.
The seller could also cut his prices to all buyers and thereby make the sale
to the buyer who had reported the lower price. Because he has charged the
same price to all buyers, the seller cannot be charged with price discrimina-
tion. Few sellers, however, will make an across-the-board price cut merely to
close a single sale.' 8
The seller's final option is to refrain from cutting his price to the buyer. By
charging the same price to all customers, the seller would be immune .to an
accusation of price discrimination. He could, however, lose the buyer as a
customer if the report of a competing offer were in fact true. This result is
unfair to the extent that it deprives the seller of his right to defend himself
against price raids from competitors. 19 More importanfly, the absence of price
cuts will reinforce the inflexible price structure of oligopolistic markets. 20
14. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior
Co., 517 F.2d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Kroger Co. v. FTC,
438 F.2d 1372, 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Wall Prods. Co. v. National
Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
15. See pt. I1(A) infra.
16. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560). But see note 293 infra.
17. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); see pt. IV(A)(4), (5)
infra.
18. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 124 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98
S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 56-57, 73; Kuenzel &
Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1235; see Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To
Study the Antitrust Laws 181 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Attorney General's Report).
19. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951).
20. See note 3 supra.
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In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 21 the Third Circuit at-
tempted to resolve this dilemma by exempting interseller price verification for
Robinson-Patman purposes from Sherman Act liability. 22 While prior cases
had reached the same conclusion, 23 Gypsum was the first decision to gauge the
effect of this practice on competition.2 4 The result was a fairly narrow
exemption for interseller price verification. 2s
But did the Gypsum restriction on interseller price verification go far
enough? This Comment explores existing case law and economic theory in an
attempt to arrive at a meaningful reconciliation of the Sherman Act and
Robinson-Patman Act. As a partial solution to this problem, some courts and
commentators have suggested an increased use of section 2(f) of the
Robinson-Patman Act 26-- the buyer liability section 27-in order to deter
buyers from misrepresenting the existence of competing offers.28 Overuse of
section 2(f), however, could have anticompetitive effects. 2 9 Accordingly, this
Comment will also discuss the extent to which section 2(f) should be used.30
II. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
In the midst of the Great Depression, the traditional wholesaler and retailer
had been displaced as the dominant force in merchandise distribution by an
aggressive new business entity-the chain store. 31 It was widely assumed that
21. 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560). For a discussion
of the Gypsum decision, see Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1491-93; 46 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 113 (1977); [1977] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 808, B-I to -4 [hereinafter cited
as BNA Analysis].
22. 550 F.2d at 126.
23. See Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943
(1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928(1972);
Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248, 251-52 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Wall Prods. Co. '.
National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 312-13 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Di-Wal, Inc. v. Fibreboard
Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,155, at 88,558 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1970).
24. See 550 F.2d at 124.
25. The Gypsum court expressly disapproved of the decisions in Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469
F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d
175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248
(S.D. Ala. 1971). See 550 F.2d at 124-25.
The Gypsum court also established the following four-part test to determine when interseller
price verification would be lawfuh "(1) the [defendants] engaged in the practice solely to comply
with the strictures of Robinson-Patman; (2) they had first resorted to all other reasonable means of
corroboration, without success; (3) they had good, independent reason to doubt the buyers'
truthfulness; and (4) their communication with competitors was strictly limited to the one price
and one buyer at issue." Id. at 126.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970).
27. See note 34 infra.
28. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d at 126; Meeting
Competition, supra note 3, at 1495-97; 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113, 124 (1977).
29. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63, 73-74 (1953).
30. See pt. VI infra.
31. Because of the volume of their business, chain stores wielded immense bargaining power
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the low price appeal of the chain stores contributed to the increasing number
of failures among small businessmen in the 1930's.32 In 1936 Congress
responded to the demand for regulation of chain stores with passage of the
Robinson-Patman Act.33
The Robinson-Patman Act contains a number of provisions, 34 the most
and obtained price discounts unavailable to smaller, independent buyers. Additional savings
resulted from operating economies, since chain stores eliminated the middleman and his profit by
performing the functions of both the wholesaler and retailer. See E. Kintner, supra note 6, at
8-11; F. Rowe, supra note 7, at 3-6.
32. See F. Rowe, supra note 7, at 4-5; 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 104-07. The
Department of Justice has questioned the validity of this assumption. See id. at 103.
33. For the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, see F. Rowe, supra note 7, at
11-23, 559-620. The preexisting price discrimination statute was § 2 of the Clayton Act. Clayton
Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current verison at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970)). Section 2 was
directed at the cutthroat pricing policies of the large national trusts of the early 1900's. Prices
would be slashed in one territory to drive competitors out of business and acquire a monopoly.
See C. Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 5-6 (1959); F. Rowe, supra note 7, at 6-7.
Designed to prevent injury at the seller level or primary line of competition, § 2 was ineffective
when dealing with the high-powered bargaining tactics of the chain stores which affected
competition at the buyer level or secondary line of competition. See E. Kintner, supra note 6, at
8-11; F. Rowe, supra note 7, at 7.
Other congressional attempts to restrict the growth of chain stores had ended in failure. A
proposed chain store tax bill died in committee hearings once it was revealed that A & P's tax
liability would have been $523 million on an annual net income of $9 million. F. Rowe, supra
note 7, at 8 n.22. The Codes of Fair Competition, authorized by the National Industrial Recovery
Act, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), collapsed when the Supreme Court invalidated the Act as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. See A L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See generally R. Rowe, supra note 7, at 10-11; 1977 Justice Dep't
Report, supra note 2, at 108-13.
Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act amends § 2 of the Clayton Act and is usually referred to
as § 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2 may serve as the basis for a civil action by a private
party, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Justice. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 21,
25 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Department of Justice leaves primary responsibility for
enforcement with the FTC. 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 3. As part of the Clayton
Act, § 2 is an "antitrust law" within the meaning of § 1 of that Act and therefore enables private
plaintiffs to recover treble damages. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 15 (1970). Critics feel this feature
exacerbates the Robinson-Patman Act's encouragement of uniform pricing. See 1977 Justice Dep't
Report, supra note 2, at 35. Incorporating the Robinson-Patman Act into the Clayton Act has
been described as a "political masterstroke which invested an anti-chain store measure with the
venerable trappings of antitrust." F. Rowe, supra note 7, at 23. The result is that, for better or
for worse, the Robinson-Patman Act now applies to all American industries.
34. Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits the payment or receipt of commissions
or brokerage allowances except for services rendered. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970). Section 2(d) and
2(e) prohibit, respectively, payment to customers for services or facilities furnished by the
purchaser, and the furnishing by sellers of services and facilities unless they are available to all
purchasers "on proportionally equal terms." 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d)-13(e) (1970). Unlike § 2(a), no
showing of injury to competition is required under these sections. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959).
Section 2(f) prohibits the buyer from knowingly inducing or receiving a discrimination in price
prohibited by § 2(a). 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970); see pt. VI infra. Sections 2(c) and 2(f) are the only
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important being section 2(a), which prohibits a seller from discriminating in
price35 among buyers of goods of like grade and quality in interstate com-
merce.36 In addition, to be unlawful, the price discrimination must have an
anticompetitive effect, which includes injury to competition among sellers,
buyers, or customers of either of them. 37 The Supreme Court's expansive
view of competitive injury38 has eased the plaintiffs burden in establishing a
prima fade case. 39
Once a prima fade case is established, the defendant has the burden of
rebutting the presumption of illegality. 40 Sections 2(a) and 2(b) set out the
available defenses, the most useful of which are the cost justification and
meeting competition defenses. 4 1 The cost justification defense allows sellers to
sections which deal directly with the buyer. This is somewhat paradoxical considering that the
Robinson-Patman Act was directed at the aggressive bargining techniques of buyers. See note 31
supra. Rowe attributes this "backdoor" approach to constitutional considerations. F. Rowe, supra
note 7, at 23.
The little-used § 3 is a criminal statute that prohibits some of the § 2 violations along with
certain other pernicious pricing practices. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970). The vagaries of § 3 cast doubt
on its constitutionality. See 1955 Attorney General's Report, supra note 18, at 201. But see United
States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963) (despite the Court's dissatis-
faction with the section, the third clause of § 3 was held constitutional "as applied").
35. Price discrimination as used in the Robinson-Patman Act means simply a difference in
price. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 550 (1960). Economists define price
discrimination as the sale of "different units of a good or service at price differentials not directly
corresponding to differences in supply cost." F. Scherer, supra note 3, at 253. Under this
definition, price discrimination includes the sale of goods with the same cost at different prices as
well as the sale of goods with different costs at the same price. Campbell & Emanuel, supra
note 3, at 128. The Act's emphasis on price difference, instead of cost difference, has been
criticized as economically unsound. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1212-14. Theoreti-
cally, any undue emphasis on price is mitigated by the cost justification defense, but in practice,
the defense is virtually impossible to establish. R. Posner, supra note 4, at 40; see text
accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). See generally E. Kintner, supra note 6, at 35-91; F. Rowe, supra
note 7, at 45-86.
37. Section 2(a) provides that price discrimination is prohibited "where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). See generally E. Kintner, supra note 6, at 110-58; F. Rowe, supra note 7,
at 113-206. The price discrimination prohibition applies equally to all levels of the distribution
chain. For example, fourth-line injury, that suffered by a disfavored customer in his competition
with a customer of a customer of the original seller's favored buyer, is also actionable. See
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); E. Kintner, supra note 6, at 97.
38. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (primary line); FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (secondary line). See also FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637
(1966); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
39. Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1212; see Eaton, supra note 9, at 413-14.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
41. Id. §§ 13(a)-13(b); see Eaton, supra note 9, at 414; Kuenzel & Schriffres, supra note 7, at
1217 ("These defenses are central to any attempt to make sense of the Act because they are its
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pass along cost economies to customers. 42 The seller's burden in establishing
the defense is, however, staggering. 43 Preparation of elaborate cost studies is
required, mere estimates being insufficient. 4 The cost of proving cost
justification-both in time and money-is prohibitive.4 5
Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, the meeting competition defense,
provides in pertinent part:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the
prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a compe-
titor.
4 6
prime method of accommodating economic and competitive considerations."). The meeting
competition defense is outlined in text accompanying notes 46-57 infra.
Other statutory defenses include changing condition and refusal to deal. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1970). The changing condition defense permits discrimination resulting from a changing condi-
tion that affects the market for goods or marketability of the goods, e.g., obsolete or perishable
goods. See F. Rowe, supra note 7, at 322. The refusal to deal defense codifies the rule of United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), that a seller, provided he is not a monopolist, has
the right to both state the terms by which he will deal and terminate business relations with those
who do not comply. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 64 (1959). A refusal to deal
carried out in concert with others, however, violates § 1 of the Sherman Act. See United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
A nonstatutory defense of availability of the lower prices to all customers also exists. See FTC
v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 659 n.17 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting); F. Rowe, supra note 7, at
97. See generally Millstein, The Status of "Availability' Under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 416 (1967). In addition, the Robinson-Patman Act is not
applicable to purchases made by certain nonprofit institutions. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1970). Sales to
the government are also exempt. See 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539, 540-41 (1936). See generally F.
Rowe, supra note 7, at 83-85.
42. Se6bon 2(a) provides in part "That nothing herein contained shall prevent differ-
entials which make only due allowance for difference; in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered .... " 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). The cost justification defense is not
available in §§ 2(c), 2(d), or 2(e) proceedings. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 176
(1960) (§ 2(c)); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 n. 1 (1959) (§§ 2(d), 2(e)). But see
Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1962).
43. Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1233. Proposed reforms of the Robinson-Patman Act
advocate a liberalization of this defense. See 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 282, 291;
Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 3, at 202-03.
44. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953); see Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra
note 7, at 1225-27; cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S 37, 48 (1948) (justification of discounts
necessitates proof "that the full amount of the discount is based on ... actual savings In cost').
Allocation of cost among joint products (e.g., primary product and by-product) and classes of
customers is particularly troublesome. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra at 1227-31.
45. See 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 22; Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at
1225-27.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970). The meeting competition defense can be traced to the original
§ 2 of the Clayton Act of 1914, Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730. The current § 2(b), 15
U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970), was intended to narrow the defense from its original form. See F. Rowe,
supra note 7, at 212-13.
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Once established, section 2(b) is an absolute defense47 and applies despite the
possible injury to nonfavored purchasers. 48 As such, section 2(b) is of consid-
erable importance considering plaintiffs ease in establishing a prima fade
case and the difficulty of proving the cost justification defense. 4 9 Moreover,
section 2(b) ameliorates the Robinson-Patman Act's tendency toward uniform
prices50 by allowing a seller to cut prices in order to meet competition. The
meeting competition defense "may be the prime means of placing Robinson-
Patman sensibly into the national antitrust policy of competition."'5 1
While recent decisions have recognized the importance of section 2(b) and
eroded a series of prior limitations 52 that made the defense difficult to
47. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250-51 (1951). While the meeting competition
defense is not available in a § 2(c) action, see FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 176-77
(1960), it can be raised in a § 2(d) or § 2(e) proceeding. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.. 360
U.S. 55, 67 n.11 (1959); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 504-05 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962) (§ 2(d)).
48. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 519-20 (1963).
49. Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1233; see text accompan)ing notes 38-45 supra.
50. See notes 4, 33 supra.
51. Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1234-35. Contra, Cohen, supra note 6, at 50-SI.
52. For example, a seller is no longer required to prove that it was meeting a lawful lower
price; a § 2(b) defense is justified unless the seller knows that the price met is unlawful or
inherently unlawful. Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383, 387 (9th Cir. 1974); National Dairy
Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 523-24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1963);
Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1956). See generally Kuenzel & Schiffres,
supra note 7, at 1251-53.
Furthermore, it now appears that § 2(b) is not restricted to a seller attempting to retain old
customers, but is also available to a seller seeking new customers. Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492
F.2d 383, 387 (9th Cir. 1974); Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 482 F 2d 220,
226-27 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974); Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306
F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962). Contra, Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); cf. Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir.
1969) (§ 2(b) defense rejected where the defendant's "offer was made in an effort to obtain
additional business from [the buyer] and not to defend itself against the inroads of rapacious
competitors"). See generally Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1253-55. As the Seventh Circuit
noted, to hold otherwise would give an established seller "a monopoly of his customers and a
seller entering the market would not be permitted to reduce his prices to compete with his
established rivals... ." Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d at 52. In addition, the seller's
existing customers to whom he had lawfully lowered his price would be favored over prospective
customers. Id. The lower prices, however, can only be granted to a buyer--old or new-who has
been offered a lower price by a competitor. Thus, blanket price cuts in a particular area are not
permitted. See Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 478 F.2d 527, S35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 859 (1973); Forster Mfg. Co., 68 F.T.C. 191, 198-99 (1965), affd, 361 F.2d 340 (1st Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). But see Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231
F.2d 356, 364-68 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
Several cases have also expanded the sources of competition to which a seller may respond. A
seller need not prove that the competing goods are of like grade and quality as his goods but only
that his goods "at various price levels generate public demand (or 'saleability ' substantially
equivalent to that of [competing goods] at the same price levels. ... Callaway Mills Co. v
FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1966). A § 2(b) defense is also available if the lower price
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sustain, 53 courts continue to comply with the congressional intent that a seller
may meet but not beat a competitor's price.5 4 A seller will be denied a
meeting competition defense if he knew or should have known that his price
would undercut a competitor's price. 55 The seller need not, however, show
that his price in fact met a competitor's price, but only the "existence of facts
which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the
granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a
competitor. ' 56 Thus a seller who in good faith unintentionally undercuts his
competition may yet be able to use the meeting competition defense.57
Ill. THE MEETING COMPETITION DEFENSE AND THE DUTY To VERIFY
A. The Standard of Good Faith
Before a seller can meet a competitor's price in good faith, he must possess
granted by the seller S-1 to his buyer B-1 is made to meet an equally low price offered by S-2, a
competitor of S-1, to B-2, a competitor or B-1. Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466
F.2d 1163, 1175 (7th Cir. 1972). If S-2 did not give B-2 a lower price, however, then S-1 cannot
lower his prices in order for B-1 to meet competition from B-2. See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S.
505, 512 n.7, 515-16 (1963). See generally Eaton, supra note 9, at 417. For the effect of this rule
on small retailers, see 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 93-97.
There is still considerable dispute as to the legality of meeting competition through pricing
systems. Compare Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1966), with
Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 492, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 959 (1966). The Supreme Court has stated that § 2(b) "places emphasis on Individual
competitive situations, rather than upon a general system of competition." FTC v. A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945). The Fifth Circuit has stated, however, that pricing systems
are not per se illegal. Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d at 441. But cf. Surprise Brassiere Co.
v. FTC, 406 F.2d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 1969) (suggesting that Callaway is limfted to cases where a
competitor's prices vary with the cumulative annual purchases of each customer). See generally
Eaton, supra note 9, at 418-19; Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1245-49.
53. Not until Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071 (1963), 27 years after the passage of
the Robinson-Patman Act, did the FTC first accept a meeting competition defense in a litigated
case. E. Kintner, supra note 6, at 179.
54. See 80 Cong. Rec. 8235 (1936). This requirement has been criticized as anticompetitive In
that it leads to price uniformity. See Shniderman, The Impact of the Robinson-Patman Act on
Pricing Flexibility, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 173, 177-78 (1962); Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at
1485-87. For a discussion of the difficulties of determining when a price meets, but does not beat,
a competitor's price, see 1955 Attorney General's Report, supra note 18, at 183-84.
55. See Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 478 F.2d 527, 535-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 859 (1973); Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Forster Mfg. Co., 68 F.T.C. 191, 203 (1965), aWOd, 361 F.2d 340
(1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
56. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945); see Eaton, supra note 9, at
416. This is also the essence of the verification requirement. See pt. I1(A) infra.
57. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 726 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568, 572-73 (5th Cir.
1970); Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 809-12 (19691, affd sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438
F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). See generally Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra
note 7, at 1249-50.
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some knowledge that indicates the necessity s" of a lower price. s 9 The initial
question, then, is how much information must the seller have before he is
entitled to react. The Supreme Court answered this question in FTC v. A.E.
Staley Manufacturing Co.:60
Section 2(b) does not require the seller to justify price discriminations by showing
that in fact they met a competitive price. But it does place on the seller the burden of
showing that the price was made in good faith to meet a competitors. . . . [T]he
statute at least requires the seller, who has knowingly discriminated in price, to show
the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that
the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a compe-
titor. 61
In determining what factual situations meet the test of good faith, courts seem
to require a certain degree of specificity and reliability. 6
1. Specificity
A seller's information on competing offers is often imprecise. 6 3 Buyers
frequently have a policy of not disclosing the terms of competing offers."
Even if a competitor's price list is available to the seller, it may not provide
accurate information, since discounts off-list price are often granted to
buyers. 65 Consequently, courts do not require the seller to have positive proof
of the amount of a competitive offer or the identity of the competitor. 66 To
hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring the seller to, in fact, meet a
competitor's price, a standard the Supreme Court rejected in Staley. 67 On the
58. Even if a seller knows of a competitor's lower price, he is not justified in cutting his price
if he knows the buyer will not accept the competitor's price. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v.
FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 524 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968).
59. Thus, a price cut made before a competitors price cut obviously was not made to meet
the competitor's price. See id. at 529; Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp.
876, 889-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affid, 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
60. 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
61. Id. at 759-60.
62. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1238. Courts which have permitted sellers to
meet competition with pricing systems have to some degree implicitly reduced the requirement of
specificity. See note 52 supra.
63. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1239.
64. See, e.g., Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 906 (1965). A few sellers may be fortunate enough to obtain a competitors invoice or valid
price list. See, e.g., Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974).
65. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383, 385 (9th Cir.
1974).
66. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906
(1965). The seller must, however, know the value of his own offer. Viviano Macaroni Co. v.
FTC, 411 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1969). Otherwise "[hie would have no way of comparing his
offer with those of [his competitors] in order to insure that his company was only making an
equally low offer and not a lower one." Id.
67. Forster M ffg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 1964). cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906
(1965); see text accompanying note 61 supra.
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other hand, the mere report of an unspecified lower price from an unknown
competitor is not specific enough to justify a price cut.68 The same result is
obtained even if the competitor is known. 69 Other than these broad param-
eters, there are no set rules for specificity.
7 0
2. Reliability
The majority of reports of competing offers originate with a seller's cus-
tomer.7 1 While a customer may supply information that is sufficiently spe-
cific, 72 the information may nevertheless be unreliable. 73 The buyer's tendency
"to secure the most advantageous terms of [sale] possible"74 may cause him to
misrepresent competing offers. 7" If a buyer's report is suspect, Staley imposes
on the seller a clear duty to verify.7 6 Thus, a buyer's report of a lower price,
68. See Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 108 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255, 258-59 (3d Cir.
1969); Forster Mfg. Co., 68 F.T.C. 191, 204 (1965), affd, 361 F.2d 340 (1st Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
69. See Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255, 259-60 (3d Cir. 1969). Knoll Assocs.,
70 F.T.C. 311, rev'd on other grounds, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968), suggests that even ifa seller
knows what the competing price is, but not who the competitor is, the seller may have difficulty
proving good faith. Knoll offered a 50% discount, instead of the standard 40%, to several
department stores which only bought at 50% off-list price. Knoll argued that it was responding to
a competitor's price since a customer could not maintain a buying policy of 50% off-list price
unless some manufacturer sold at such a price. Id. at 417. The FTC was not persuaded, stating
that Knoll failed to demonstrate "a causal connection between its own lower prices and those of
its competitors." Id. at 415.
70. Good faith, of course, is a subjective standard and will vary with the facts of each case.
For example, a competitor's act may be found specific enough to warrant a reaction. In Harbor
Banana Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 499 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1974), the defendant's competitor
constructed a conveyor belt between his terminal and a customer's adjacent plant. These facts
were found sufficient to justify a discriminatory special delivery to the customer. Id. at 398-99.
71. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1239.
72. See, e.g., National Dairy Prods. Corp., 70 F.T.C. 79, 208 (1966), qff'd, 395 F.2d 517 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968). See generall Steele, Section 2(b) of the Robinson-
Patman Act-Rules for Meeting Competition in the Past and the Present, 13 Antitrust Bull. 1223,
1264-65 (1968).
73. The issue of reliability usually arises when information is obtained from a customer. Of
course, information from other sources must also be reliable. For example, an outdated price list
that provides specific information would nevertheless be unreliable. Similarly, a competitor's bid
made to a public institution exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act and involving different
delivery costs is not a reliable indication of a competitor's bid. See National Dairy Prods. Corp.
v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 528 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, .193 U.S. 977 (1968).
74. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945).
75. See cases cited note 14 supra.
76. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945). The same rule has been
applied to a buyer charged with inducing discriminatory promotional payments. See Colonial
Stores Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 733, 745-46 (5th Cir. 1971) (buyer cannot avoid liability under § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act by relying on seller's written representation that promo-
tional payments are offered on a proportionally equal basis, when buyer has knowledge that this
is not the case).
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suspect in light of a seller's own cost study, cannot be relied upon without
independent verification. 7
If there is no indication of a buyer's unreliability, however, the existence of
a duty to verify is unclear. Staley is susceptible of two interpretations. In
Staley the seller relied upon the buyers' report of lower prices "in circum-
stances which strongly suggested that the buyers' claims were without merit
.... The Court felt that these circumstances and the absence of any efforts
to verify the reports, "taken together," did not constitute good faith.79 Thus,
the Court's creation of a duty to verify arguably could be limited to cases in
which the seller has some independent factual indication that the buyer's
report is suspect.8 0 On the other hand, the Court's reference to the buyer's
tendency "to secure the most advantageous terms of [sale] possible"8 ' suggests
that the buyer is inherently unreliable. Under this reading of Staley the seller
may always have a duty to verify a buyer's report of a lower price, for the
report would always be sufficiently suspect.
Lower courts have split on their interpretation of Staley. The Third Circuit
requires the seller to investigate the buyer's report of a lower price in all cases
to protect "the integrity of the section 2(b) defense. 812 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit has suggested that reliance on the buyer alone satisfies the requirement
of good faith. In Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 8 3 competitors of Texaco offered the
buyer, a gas station owner, a price for gasoline. The buyer informed Texaco
of these offers but nevertheless accepted'a higher Texaco offer.8 4 The buyer
continued to inform Texaco of better offers and threatened to stop purchases
if Texaco did not make a better offer.85 Texaco then granted a discriminatory
price cut.8 6 Without any reference to efforts by Texaco to verify the buyer's
report of lower prices,87 the court upheld as a matter of law Texaco's meeting
77. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 528-29 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 977 (1968).
78. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945).
79. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
80. Cf. Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1239 ("need to verify arises only when the
information at hand is inadequately specific and reliable'.
81. 324 U.S. at 759.
82. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98
S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1969).
The Viviano court stated: "While we can again sympathize with the difficulty facing petitioner in
finding precise information as to the identity of the competitors and the amount of offers, there is
no indication in the record that Samuel Viviano did anything more than merely accept the word
of the [buyer] as to there being competitive offers outstanding." Id. at 259; accord, Glowacki v.
Borden, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 348, 358 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co.,
326 F. Supp. 295, 313 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
83. 492 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 385-86.
85. Id. at 386.
86. Id.
87. The buyer's report of a competing offer was for a discount off the posted dealer prices. Id.
at 385. Otherwise, the offer could have been verified by reference to the posted price.
1978]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
competition defense*88
The validity of Cadigan, however, is questionable. It is inconsistent with
Staley, which requires verification if the buyer's report is suspect.8 9 In
Cadigan, the buyer's report was extremely suspect, considering his acceptance
of Texaco's initial offer after claiming he had received a better one. This
unusual business practice should have suggested to Texaco that the better
offers did not, in fact, exist. 90 In addition, the Third Circuit's distrust of the
buyer represents a more realistic view of the marketplace since the buyer and
the seller are "commercial antagonists." 9 1 As the First Circuit stated:
The seller wants the highest price he can get and the buyer wants to buy as cheaply as
he can, and to achieve their antagonistic ends neither expects the other, or can be
expected, to lay all his cards face up on the table. Battle of wits is the rule. Haggling
has ever been the way of the marketplace. 92
As noted before, it is not uncommon for buyers to misrepresent the amount of
competing offers, 93 a practice which lends further support to the Third
Circuit's position .94
B. Forms of Verification
Direct verification of a buyer's report of a competing price may occur in a
variety of ways. A competitor's price list may be publicly available 95 or the
competitor may have made a public bid to certain stores. 96 The buyer may
88. Id. One court has stated that the Cadigan court simply failed to indicate that the seller
had independently verified the buyer's report. See Glowacki v. Borden, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 348,
358 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Thus, Cadigan could still be viewed as consistent with the Third
Circuit's position that the seller must verify the buyer's report of a lower price.
89. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
90. This argument presumes no strong brand preferences among consumers for Texaco
gasoline, which would have enabled the buyer to pass his higher costs on to the consumer. See
generally F. Scherer, supra note 3, at 10. The court's opinion made no mention of brand
preference.
91. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906
(1965).
92. Id.
93. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
94. Several other cases appear, at first glance, to support Cadigan by indicating that a seller
can rely on a buyer's report of a lower price without direct, independent verification. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1970); Krieger v. Texaco, Inc., 373 F. Supp.
108, 112 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 809-12 (1969), aff'd sub nor.
Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). These cases can
be harmonized with the duty to verify, however, in that some evidence was present from which
the existence of a competing price could be inferred, thereby lending credence to the buyer's
report. Those cases, dealing with the form of verification rather than the duty to verify, will be
discussed in pt. III(B) infra.
95. See, e.g., Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220, 226 (5th CIr.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974).
96. See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 718
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
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even show the seller a written quotation signed by a competitor. 97 Unfortu-
nately, in many cases such direct verification is not possible. Nevertheless, the
existence of a competing price may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances. Recent decisions seem to indicate the willingness of the courts
to permit this indirect form of verification.
1. Similar Reports
Reports of lower prices from more than one buyer may indicate the
reliability of a buyer's report. 98 In Jones v. Borden Co., 99 Borden's sales
dropped following a price cut by a competitor.100 Borden inquired whether a
five-percent discount would make it competitive again, and after the buyer
replied that "that would be about right," Borden granted the discount. 10 The
discount was given to a second customer after he, too, reported that Borden
was five-percent higher than competition.1 02 Borden also granted this dis-
count to two other buyers after they reported that Borden was being under-
sold. 10 3 The court held as a matter of law that Borden's granting of the
discounts was a good faith effort to meet competition.10 4 Similarly, in
McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 105 Texaco's price cut to three different retailers
who reported competing prices was deemed to be in good faith.10 6 This
approach may be inappropriate, however, in a market where most buyers
have a proven reputation for misrepresenting offers. 10 7 Ir. such a case the fact
that several buyers report a competing offer would add little credence to the
report.
2. Termination of Sales
A meeting competition defense has been upheld where a termination or a
lack of sales has coincided with a buyer's report of a lower price. In Krieger v.
Texaco, Inc., 108 an owner of several gas stations stopped buying from Texaco
97. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 68 F.T.C. 286, 316-17, 350 (1965).
98. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1239. Several reports of the availability of better
prices, however, do not justify a blanket price cut in a particular area. See note 52 supra. In
addition, the reports must come from buyers who have been offered better prices and not from
those who have only heard of a better price. See Forster Mfg. Co., 68 F.T.C. 191, 196-97 (1965),
affd, 361 F.2d 340 (Ist Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
99. 430 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1970).
100. Id. at 572-73.
101. Id. at 573.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104 Id. In addition to the similar reports of a lower price, Borden's good faith defense was
also bolstered by the drop in sales. See pt. lfl(BX2) infra.
105. 351 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D. Ala. 1972), affid mem. sub nom. Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc.. 486
F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1973).
106. ld. at 1340.
107. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115. 121 (3d Cir.). cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); vall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F
Supp. 295, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
108. 373 F. Supp. 108 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
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for one station after reporting competing offers. 109 Texaco's price cuts to him
were deemed to be a good faith effort to meet competition. 0 In International
Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., I after several customers
stopped purchasing the seller's product, the seller responded with a discount
which still did not generate any sales."12 After a buyer reported the
availability of a better discount, the seller increased his discount. ''3 The court
upheld the seller's meeting competition defense even though buyers in this
market often misrepresented competing offers. 114
There is danger in extending this reasoning too far. Arguably a mere threat
to stop purchases could be used to infer the reliability of a buyer's report. I "
But every demand by a buyer for a lower price contains an implied threat to
stop purchases. If this rationale is used, practically all price discrimination
could be justified, thereby emasculating the Robinson-Patman Act.116
3. Appraisal of Market Conditions
The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) decision in Beatrice Foods Co. "17
suggests that a seller's appraisal of market conditions may be sufficient for
him to determine the reliability of a buyer's report of a competing price. 18 In
Beatrice the buyer, Kroger, requested "winner-take-all" bids for the supply of
private label milk. After Beatrice offered a seventeen-percent discount,
Kroger misrepresented to Beatrice that it had one offer of a twenty-percent
discount and expected an even better offer. 119 After reviewing a range of
market data,1 20 Beatrice concluded that a competing offer could have been in
the range of a twenty-percent discount and therefore offered a successful bid
slightly in excess of a twenty-percent discount.' 2'
The FTC permitted Beatrice's meeting competition defense in a three-to-
two decision, stating that Beatrice "did everything in their power to find the
109. Id. at 112.
110. Id.
111. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
112. Id. at 718. The seller verified this first discount directly by a reference to a competitor's
public bid. Id.
113. Furthermore, the second discount undercut the competition. Id. at 718-19.
114. Id. at 726; cf. Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., 64 F.T.C. 937, 976 (1964) (drop in sales,
after the challenged price cut was withdrawn, used to support seller's claim of good faith).
115. A threat to terminate purchases was present in Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383,
386 (9th Cir. 1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 83-90 supra.
116. Of course, there are some who do not consider this an undesirable goal. See note 6 supra
and accompanying text.
117. 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), affld sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). The Sixth Circuit's decision dealt only with the liability of the buyer,
Kroger.
118. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1240.
119. 76 F.T.C. at 794. Kroger was found guilty of a § 2(f) violation. Id. at 821.
120. The information considered included the identity of the competitor and its cost formula,




right price level in a cautious and prudent manner . ... ,"22 In essence,
Beatrice simply attempted "to gather as much information from the buyer as
possible and appraise the information in light of market conditions."' 123 The
Beatrice decision has received favorable comment from both courts and
commentators. 1 2 4
4. Interseller Verification
Use of the indirect forms of verification discussed above would enable most
sellers to satisfy the verification requirement without resorting to interseller
verification. But in the case where such means are unavailable, the only
remaining source of information concerning a competing offer is the compe-
titor himself.' 25 Even if other forms of verification are available, the seller
may contact his competitor to assure compliance with the good faith require-
ments of section 2(b);12 6 a competitor represents the ultimate source of specific
and reliable information as to a competing offer.' 2 7 Interseller price ver-
ification, however, constitutes an exchange of price information among com-
petitors, raising the possibility of a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The conflict between interseller price verification and the Sherman Act is
discussed next.
IV. TIHE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF PRICE INFORMATION
EXCHANGES AMONG COMPETITORS
A. Exchanges of Price Information and the Sherman Act
The exchange of price information among competitors has a different effect
on competition depending upon the market in which the exchange occurs.
1 28
In a purely competitive market, the exchange of price information facilitates
allocative efficiency. 12 9 Buyers will purchase only at the lowest prices and
sellers will respond more effectively to changes in demand.
130
In an oligopoly, however, the exchange of price information may have an
122. Id. at 809.
123. Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1240.
124. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d Cir., cerf.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); Kuenzel & Schiffres. supra note 7. at 1240.
125. In several interseller price verification cases, the court has stated that all other means of
verification had been exhausted before the seller contacted his competitor. United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. CL 52 (1977) (No.
76-1560); Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943
(1973); Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 310 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
126. In Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.). cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972).
the seller contacted his competitor even though the reported price was publicly available in trade
journals. Id. at 181.
127. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d Cir.), cert granted,
98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560). Of course, even the information obtained from a competitor
may be unreliable since he, too, is a commercial antagonist of the seller. See note 293 intfra.
128. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).




undesirable effect. The oligopolist has such a large share of the market that he
can increase his price by reducing his output. 131 Theoretically, the oligopolist
will produce less and raise his price to an artificially high level. 132 At this
point the oligopolist's goal is to avoid price competition and maintain the
current price level.133 A seller's uncertainty about the pricing activities of his
competitors, however, leads to a corresponding insecurity over whether he
should maintain the established price level. 134 The exchange of price infor-
mation eliminates this uncertainty and serves to coordinate pricing decisions
among oligopolists. 1
35
The nature and effect of price information exchanges has brought the
practice within the purview of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."'136
Under this section, certain inherently anticompetitive practices are
considered per se illegal.137 The legality of all other restraints of trade,
however, is judged under a rule of reason standard which calls for a
consideration of the nature and business justifications of the behavior com-
plained of, along with its effect on competition. 138 In several landmark
131. See F. Scherer, supra note 3, at 10.
132. Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 3, at 132 n.37.
133. Price cuts are fruitless from the oligopolists' point of view. The other sellers will quickly
retaliate with their own price cuts with the net result being lower profits for all. See United States
v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); F. Scherer, supra note 3, at 147. To
prevent this matching and to increase their profits, sellers may engage in secret price cuts. Id. at
208. Any overuse of the secret price cut will eventually be discovered, however, precipitating an
industrywide price cut. Id.
134. Id. at 136.
135. What Happened, supra note 9, at 642-44.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
137. Per se violations include price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940), tying arrangement, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), market
divisions, United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), and group boycotts, Fashion
Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
Justice Black justified the use of a per se rule as follows: "[T]here are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness ... avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved ... in an effort to determine at large
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable--an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
undertaken." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see United States v.
Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. Justice Brandeis once described the rule of reason's operation: "[Tihe legality of an
agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains
competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.... The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
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decisions, the Supreme Court considered the application of section 1 to price
information exchanges among competitors. It is difficult, however, to draw
from these cases a rule of universal applicability.
B. The Early Decisions
Early Supreme Court decisions were concerned with the exchange of price
information among members of trade associations. In American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, ,39 the American Hardwood Manufacturers'
Association distributed a report of current prices.1 40 Monthly meetings were
held during which association officials discussed future price and production
levels. 14 ' In United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., ' 4 2 trade association
members agreed to furnish information pertaining to all purchases of their
products.' 43 Members submitted price schedules, adherence to which was
obtained by the threat of fines.' 44 Finding in both cases that the purpose and
effect of the action was to stabilize prices, the Court held that the trade
associations' activities violated section 1.145
In the companion cases of Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v.
United States'4 6 and Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United
States, ' 47 however, the Court upheld the exchange of price information among
trade association members. In Maple Flooring, the Maple Flooring Manufactur-
ers Association distributed information as to average cost, production, and
prices.' 48 In contrast to the previous trade association cases, parties to individual
sales transactions were not identified and only information on past sales was
distributed. While there was no evidence that the exchange of information
resulted in uniform prices,' 49 the Court acknowledged the tendency of such an
exchange to stabilize prices.' 50 Nevertheless, the absence of a purpose to fix
prices absolved the defendants of liability.' s '
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The
Supreme Court's latest discussion of the rule of reason is in accord with this approach. See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2557-61 & n.1S (1977).
139. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
140. Id. at 396. A sales report was also distributed which identified the purchasers and price
paid. Id.
141. Id. at 396-99, 402-04.
142. 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
143. Id. at 381.
144. Id. at 389.
145. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. at 411-12; see United States
v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. at 387, 390.
146. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
147. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
148. 268 U.S. at 586.
149. Id. at 567.
150. Id. at 582.
151. See id. at 585-86. The purpose of the Maple Flooring exchange was to conduct business
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Cement Manufacturers was similar to the earlier trade association cases in that
members exchanged information concerning prices charged specific custom-
ers.' 5 2 The information was used in connection with specific job contracts 5 3
which, in essence, were one-way options in favor of the purchasing contractor.
In a specific job contract, manufacturers agreed to provide the entire cement
requirement for a specific construction job at a set price.15 4 The manufacturer
was obligated to supply only the cement for the specific job in the contract. 155
Contractors took advantage of this system by obtaining commitments from
several suppliers for the same job. 156 Through the exchange of price informa-
tion, defendants attempted to determine whether the cement contracted for in a
specific job contract was actually being used for the job specified. 15 7 As in Maple
Flooring, the Court noted that the exchange would tend to stabilize prices. '5 8
Because, however, their purpose was not to fix prices, but rather to prevent
fraud, the defendants were absolved from liability.' 5 9
C. The Recent Decisions
1. United States v. Container Corp. of America
In Maple Flooring and Cement Manufacturers the Court focused upon the
purpose-of the exchanges as the determinative element in a section 1 charge
against competitors who exchanged price information. In United States v.
Container Corp. ofAmerica, 160 the Court abruptly departed from this approach
by invalidating an exchange of price information because of its stabilizing effect
on prices. The Court did not overrule the two prior cases, choosing instead to
distinguish these decisions carefully on their facts. Unlike Maple Flooring, the
information exchanged in Container included the prices charged to specific
customers. 161 In language that was to become the focus of later decisions, the
Court distinguished Cement Manufacturers in that there was present in that case
a "controlling circumstance," the protection of the cement manufacturers' legal
operations in an intelligent manner, a result the Court felt the Sherman Act was not intended to
inhibit. Id. at 583.
152. The defendants also exchanged information on transportation costs and overdue ac-
counts. 268 U.S. at 592.
153. Id. at 594.
154. Id. This system allowed the contractor to bid on jobs with a fixed cement cost. The
contractor was not obligated to purchase the cement, and, if prices declined, he could back out.
But if prices increased the manufacturer was still obligated to deliver. Id. at 594-95.
155. Id. at 595.
156. Id. In this way, the contractors obtained cement at a fixed price that could be used for
other jobs not covered by the contract.
157. Id. at 596.
158. Id. at 604. The evidence presented did not clearly show how the exchange of informa-
tion had affected prices. See id. at 605-06.
159. Id. at 595-96, 606.
160. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
161. Id. at 334-35. Thus, an exchange of average cost data that does not reveal current prices
as to specific customers would seem beyond the scope of Container.
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rights from fraud in specific job contracts.' 62 Despite these distinctions, the
Court clearly moved away from the purpose-oriented approach of Maple Floor-
ing and Cement Manufacturers. ' 63 The Container opinion emphasized the effect
on prices and made no reference to the purpose of the exchange.16
Defendants in Container were eighteen manufacturers who accounted for
ninety-percent of the shipments of corrugated containers from plants in the
southeastern United States. 1 65 Because of the fungible nature of the containers
the principal basis of competition was price.' 66 Whenever price information was
not available from other sources, defendants contacted each other to obtain
information as to the current price available to specific customers, 67 in order to
verify customer reports of competing offers. ' 68 Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court, found that the result of the exchange of information was to stabilize
prices, although at a downward level. ' 69
Knowledge of a competitor's price usually meant matching that price. . . . [In an
oligopolistic industry with a fungible product and inelastic demand, the] exchange of
price data tends toward price uniformity .... The inferences are irresistible that the
exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive effect in the industry,
chilling the vigor of price competition.' 70
The stabilization of prices brought the case within the ban of section 1 of the
Sherman Act since "interference with the setting of price by free market forces
162. Id. at 335.
163. See Kefauver, The Legality of Dissemination of Market Data by Trade Associations:
What Does Container Hold?, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 791 (1972) ("Container placed a new
emphasis on the effect of competitors' exchange of market information."); The Supreme Court,
1968 Term, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 234-35 (1969).
164. The Court found the agreement in Container, "though somewhat casual," analogous to
those in American Column and American Linseed. 393 U.S. at 337. In both cases a purpose to fix
prices had been found. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
165. 393 U.S. at 336. The six largest defendants controlled 60%1 of the market. Id. at 342
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 337. Demand was inelastic since buyers ordered only for their immediate
requirements. Id.
167. Id. at 335. Although there was no express agreement to exchange price information, the
Court determined that the reciprocal nature of the exchange satisfied the "combination or
conspiracy" element of § 1. A defendant furnished the information requested "with the expecta-
tion that it would be furnished reciprocal information when it wanted it." Id. (footnote omitted).
Although there was freedom to withdraw from the agreement, a defendant who requested and
received price information "affirm[ed] [his] willingness to furnish such information in return." Id.
Justice Fortas, concurring, and the dissent believed that an agreement to exchange price
information existed. Id. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring), 340 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 67 (M.D.N.C. 1967),
rev'd, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). This, of course, is similar to the alleged purpose of the interseller price
verification in the Robinson-Patman Act cases. See text accompanying notes 218, 238 infra.
Compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, however, was not, apparently, at issue in Container.
See note 250 infra.
169. 393 U.S. at 336.
170. Id. at 336-37.
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is unlawful per se." 17 1 Justice Douglas concluded the Court's opinion in broad
language stating that "[p]rice is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it
to be used even in an informal manner to restrain competition." 1 72
The exact holding of Justice Douglas' opinion has proven to be elusive. 173
An issue largely unresolved by the opinion is whether it established a per se
standard of liability for agreements to exchange price information concerning
specific customers. 174 Justice Fortas, concurring in the majority decision,
stated that it did not establish a per se rule. 175 It is unclear, however, what
test the Court did establish. 176 Both the majority and Justice Fortas relied on
the actual effect on price to find liability.1 77 The dissenting Justices would
also have found liability if the exchange had affected prices, 178 but, unlike the
majority and Justice Fortas, they found no effect on prices. 179 Thus Container
would seem to have created a modified per se test; once an effect on prices has
been shown, liability will be automatically imposed.180
2. United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank
The elusive holding of Container is reflected in the morass of lower court
decisions subsequent to Container.'8' Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank'8 2 has
171. Id. at 337 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223, 224 n.59
(1940)).
172. Id. at 338 (footnote ommitted).
173. For Justice Douglas' personal outlook on competition and the Sherman Act, see W.
Douglas, Go East, Young Man 306-07 (1974).
174. The use of the term "per se" in the opinion is partly responsible for the problem. See 393
U.S. at 337, 338 n.4. In addition, the opinion refers to both actual effects on prices and an
"irresistable inference" that prices were affected. Compare id. at 336 with id. at 337.
175. Id. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring). The dissent also declined to adopt a per se
standard of liability. Id. at 340 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Yet, all three opinions in the decision
exhibit a willingness, to varying degrees, to imply anticompetitive effects from an exchange of
price information in certain circumstances. What Happened, supra note 9, at 653-55.
176. Commentary on this topic has been prolific. See, e.g., Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee
Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 475, 500
(1977) (rule of reason); What Happened, supra note 9, at 654 (modified per se rule) & n.62
(compilation of commentary); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 233-34 (1969)
(per se rule); 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113, 127-28 n. 117 (1977) (compilation of commentary).
177. 393 U.S. at 336. Justice Fortas concluded that the 'evidence, although not overwhelm-
ing, is sufficient in the special circumstances of this case to show an actual effect on pricing .. .
Id. at 339 (Fortas, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 344. This was also the finding of the lower court. United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 67 (M.D.N.C. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
180. This test should be distinguished from the modified per se interpretation of Container
posited in What Happened, supra note 9, at 654-55. It is there suggested that Container
established a test whereby the anticompetitive effects of exchanges of information would be
presumed in a sufficiently oligopolistic market. Id.
181. These cases have been collected and summarized elsewhere. See id. at 657 n.69; 46 Gco.
Wash. L. Rev. 113, 127-28 n.117 (1977).
182. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
1978] INTERSELLER PRICE VERIFICATION
"contributed to the confusion. s18 3 The defendant bank, Citizens & South-
ern, 184 confronted with state restrictions on branch banking, founded several
de facto branches in suburban areas.' 85 Citizens & Southern would acquire
five-percent of the stock of a bank, and officers, shareholders and customers
of Citizens & Southern would purchase the majority of the remaining
shares. 186 Citizens & Southern provided these de facto branches with infor-
mation on a variety of banking procedures including the current interest rates
and service charges in effect at Citizens & Southern and its other affiliates. 187
This pricing information was stamped "for information only" and each bank
was warned to use its own judgment in setting interest rates and service
charges. 1
88
The Government challenged the branching program as a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. '8 9 Applying the rule of reason approach, 90 the
Court found that the relationship between Citizens & Southern and its de
facto branches was not an unreasonable restraint of trade. 19' The branching
program was designed to avoid the anticompetitive state restriction on branch
banking, which made the residents of suburban and rural areas "a captive
market" for the local banks.' 92 Because the de facto branches provided new
options to suburban customers without eliminating any existing options, the
branching programs were "plainly . . . procompetitive."' 9 3
183. What Happened, supra note 9, at 658.
184. Citizens & Southern, along with three other banks, controlled 75% of the commercial
banking business in the Atlanta area. 422 U.S. at 131 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
185. A Georgia statute prohibited bank holding companies from acquiring more than 5% of a
bank's stock. Ga. Code Ann. § 13-207(a)(2) (1967 & Supp. 1974) (amended 1976).
186. 422 U.S. at 92. In order for the branch banks to obtain regulatory approval, Citizens &
Southern provided assurances of financial backing. It also selected the chief executive officers for
each bank and supervised the selection of directors. Id. at 92-93.
187. Id. at 93.
188. Id. The dissent pointed out, however, that on occasion Citizens & Southern had
exhorted the branches to "get the rates [on loans] up." Id. at 132. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. The Government's suit followed an attempt by Citizens & Southern to convert the de
facto branches into de jure branches following an amendment to the state banking laws. Id. at
94. In addition to challenging the ongoing relationship between Citizens & Southern and its
branches as a violation of the Sherman Act, the Government alleged that the proposed
acquisitions violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), a claim the Court eventually
rejected. 422 U.S. at 120-22.
The Government's theory in the Sherman Act charge was that Citizens & Southern and its de
facto branches were legally distinct corporate entities obligated to compete with each other. Id. at
112.
190. See id. at 116 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
191. Id. at 117-20.
192. Id. at 118.
193. Id. at 119. The dissent argued that the de facto branches were unnecessary since the
state had amended the banking laws to permit branch banking in the suburbs. Thus, the
desirability of the de facto branches was "relevant only insofar as it may also be claimed that
continuation of such arrangements undisturbed by the Sherman Act would be vital to their
creation were Georgia to reinstate its restrictions in the future," an argument the dissent found
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Alternatively, the Government asserted a Sherman Act violation in that the
branching programs "encompassed at least a tacit agreement to fix interest
rates and service charges, . . . so as to make the interrelationships-to that
extent at least-illegal 'per se.' "194 Asserting unequivocally that "dissemina-
tion of price information is not itself aper se violation of the Sherman Act,"' 195
the Court finally resolved the per se controversy created by Container.196
Citizens & Southern, however, raises another problem. The Court noted
that the exchange of price information resulted in a lack of price competi-
tion. 197 Under the modified per se reading of Container,19 this effect on
prices would have required a finding of liability. Yet in Citizens & Southern
no purpose to fix prices was found and the defendant was absolved from
liability. 99 At first glance, Citizens & Southern would appear to resurrect
Maple Flooring and Cement Manufacturers in that a showing of a price fixing
conspiracy is necessary to invalidate an exchange of price information. 20 0 A
better interpretation, however, would be that the Court simply applied a
broad rule of reason standard to determine if the exchange of information
violated the Sherman Act. Although the Court never expressly stated that the
procompetitive effects of the de facto branches outweighed the lack of price
competition caused by the exchange of interest rates and service charges, such
a balancing is implicit in the Court's opinion. 20 1
Citizens & Southern's rule of reason standard is a clear break from
Container's emphasis on the effect of an exchange of price information on
prices. 20 2 Arguably, Citizens & Southern could be classified as a sui generis
unpersuasive. Id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Velvel, Carving Holes in the
Sherman Act: A Comment on the Citizens & Southern Case, 25 Cath. L. Rev. 535, 546-48 (1976).
194. 422 U.S. at 112-13 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 113.
196. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 1i3 n.9 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560). But see What Happened, supra note 9, at 659. The
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Douglas, the Container author, joined, did not discuss the
majority's rejection of a per se rule. On this portion of the Government's claim, the dissent simply
noted that the lower court did not find an express agreement to fix prices that would require the
use of a per se rule. 422 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One commentator has interpreted
the majority's decision, which clearly refers to the exchange of price information, as suggesting
that the Court is retreating from a per se rule for all price fixing. See Velvel, supra note 193, at
537-41.
197. 422 U.S. at 113-14; id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. See text accompanying notes 177-80 supra.
199. 422 U.S. at 113-14.
200. See text accompanying notes 145-58 supra.
201. One commentator has suggested that the weighing of the procompetitive versus an-
ticompetitive effects of the exchange of information in Citizens & Southern represents an
"unfortunate" retreat from the Court's reluctance in United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972), to weigh competitive effects in different sectors of the economy. Velvel,
supra note 193, at 544-46.
202. Of course, many courts and commentators have interpreted Container as applying a rule
of reason standard. See What Happened, supra note 9, at 654 n.62, 657 n.69; 46 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 113, 127-28 n.117.
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exception to Container;20 3 even the Court was aware of the unusual facts of
the case. 204 Furthermore, lower court decisions subsequent to Citizens &
Southern involving exchanges of price information have continued to treat
Container as the 'leading Supreme Court case. 205 Nevertheless, Citizens &
Southern's failure to cite the Container majority opinion would seem to
indicate that the "new antitrust majority" 20 6 of the Court is disenchanted with
Container. On balance, the Citizens & Southern approach appears to be an
improvement over the Container approach. By employing a rule of reason,
Citizens & Southern utilizes a balancing test to determine the overall effect on
competition. The overall effect on competition would seem to be more
important than the effect of an exchange of information on prices, which is
what Container emphasizes. For example, if the Court had applied the
Container rationale in Citizens & Southern, it would have prohibited the
exchange of price information and consequently increased competition for
interest rates and service charges. The prohibition, however, would also have
inhibited the opening of de facto branches in the future. 20 7 Thus the Court
would have achieved increased competition in interest rates and service
charges at the cost of eliminating an entirely new source of competition. Such
a result would be "penny-wise and pound-foolish."
It could also be argued that Container remains the better rule where an
oligopoly exists, considering that there is a greater likelihood in an oligopoly
that an exchange of price information will stabilize prices and increase price
rigidity. 20 8 But the commercial banking industry in Citizens & Southern was
even more concentrated than the corrugated container industry in Con-
203. See What Happened, supra note 9, at 659.
204. The Court used hedging language to describe the problem before it: -Were we dealing
with independent competitors having no permissible reason for intimate and continuous coopera-
tion and consultation as to almost every facet of doing business, the evidence adduced here might
well preclude a finding that the parties were not engaged in a conspiracy to affect prices. But..
[the branching program was] permissible under the Sherman Act. In this unusual light," the
Court could not find a violation of the Sherman Act. 422 U.S. at 113-14.
205. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 122-23 (3d Cir., cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir.
1976). cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1090, 1106-07 (N.D. Tex. 1976), aff'd, 566 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Gypsum court, however, applied what was in essence a rule of reason standard. See text
accompanying notes 278-80 infra. The courts in Hanson and L.C.L. Theatres found that neither
the purpose nor the effect of the exchange of price information was to stabilize prices. Hanson v.
Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d at 1359-60; L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 421
F. Supp. at 1106-07. Only the Gypsum decision involved exchanges of price information for the
purpose of compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act.
206. United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602, 642 (1974) (White. J., dissenting);
Velvel, supra note 193, at 535 & n.l.
207. In a case .where the opening of a new branch was being considered, a prohibition of
exchanges of interest rates and service charges would be a factor considered by a parent bank in
deciding not to open a new branch. See 422 U.S. at 119.
208. See pt. IV(A) supra.
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tainer.2° 9 Even in an industrial oligopoly devoid of the byzantine banking
regulations of Citizens & Southern, the rule of reason standard would be
more appropriate, for industrial oligopolies have their own set of byzantine
regulations-the Robinson-Patman Act. In United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 2 10 the Third Circuit indicated that an exchange of price infor-
mation in an oligopoly for Robinson-Patman purposes, which resulted in a
stabilization of prices, was nevertheless procompetitive. 211 Although the
Third Circuit's conclusion may have been based upon a misinterpretation of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 212 it nevertheless evinces a dissatisfaction with the
arbitrary nature of the Container approach. In addition, the Robinson-
Patman Act's concern for competition at the secondary level 213 would not
even be considered under the Container standard, which looks only to the
effect of prices at the primary level. In essence, the Container standard is too
narrow. Although not a true per se test, it has per se characteristics; once an
effect on prices at the primary level is shown, liability is automatic. On
balance, Citizens & Southern's rule of reason approach seems to be the better
standard.
V. INTERSELLER PRICE VERIFICATION FOR ROBINSON-PATMAN PURPOSES
AND THE SHERMAN ACT
A. The Interseller Price Verifcation Cases
1. Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co.
Of the six lower court decisions that have permitted interseller price
verification for purposes of compliance with the meeting competition defense of
the Robinson-Patman Act, Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co. 2 1 4 is
perhaps the most important.215 Wall Products also ifivolves essentially the
209. Compare note 184 supra with text accompanying note 165 supra.
210. 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560).
211. See text accompanying notes 250-56 infra.
212. See pt. V(BX2) infra.
213. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1214.
214. 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
215. The other interseller verification cases, to varying degrees, have relied on Wall Products
to support their conclusions. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 124
(3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d
175, 182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp.
248, 252 (S.D. Ala. 1971). In Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 943 (1973), the court did not cite Wall Products but did cite Belliston, which had relied
on Wall Products. Id. at 747.
An earlier decision, Di-Wal, Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,155 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 17, 1970), dealt with the same litigation as Wall Products, The Di-Wal opinion resulted after
one defendant, Fibreboard Corp., moved for dismissal of the charges against it at the end of
plaintiffs' case. In Di-Wal the court found that the purpose of the defendant's verification
requests and replies was to comply with the good faith standard of the meeting competition
defense. Id. at 88,557. Without citing Container, the court concluded that no violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act had occurred. Id. at 88,558. Following the Di-Wal opinion the remaining
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same allegations in the gypsum wallboard industry that were the subject of
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 2 16 a case whose outcome will
probably decide the fate of interseller price verification.
In the 1960's the gypsum wallboard industry was a classic homogeneous
oligopoly with price being the principal basis of competition.2 1 7 An under-
utilization of capacity created strong pressure for price reductions in order to
generate more sales. 218 The resulting price cuts took the form of secret
discounts off the published list price.21 9 Purchasers of wallboard, however,
exploited market conditions by playing one seller against another for better
prices. Price reductions spread quickly throughout the industry.22 0
It should be recalled that the good faith standard of the meeting competi-
tion defense requires sellers to have rieliable information before acting on
buyers' reports of a competing offer. 22' In the wallboard industry, many
buyers misrepresented the price of competing offers while refusing to produce
invoices or other written support.22 2 In order to obtain reliable information,
the competing sellers agreed to comply with each other's requests for the
prices charged to particular customers. 22 3 Verification calls were made only
defendants presented their evidence and the court then issued its more extensive Wall Products
opinion.
For commentary on the Wal! Products decision, see Note, The Robinson-Patmn Meeting of
Competition Defense as Used in a Sherman, Section 1, Conspiracy Action, 25 Baylor L. Rev. 357
(1973); What Happened, supra note 9, at 661-66 & n.104.
216. 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. CL 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560). Wall Products
contains a detailed description of the gypsum wallboard industry, which, to a large extent, is
applicable to Gypsum.
217. 326 F. Supp. at 301, 305. See generally F. Scherer, supra note 3, at 10. In 1968 the total
number of producers was 14. Market entry was relatively easy, however, and several local, single
plant producers had entered the market between 1960 and 1968. The five largest producers, four
of whom were defendants, accounted for 68% of industry sales in 1968. Defendants United States
Gypsum Co. and National Gypsum Co. were the two largest producers and accounted for 56% of
industry sales. 326 F. Supp. at 301-02.
218. 326 F. Supp. at 305. This underutilization of capacity resulted from a 41% expansion in
plant capacity between 1960 and 1968 and a simultaneous decline in the growth of demand.
Demand for wallboard was dependent upon residential construction, which was in a slump and
inelastic since wallboard was a small element in the total cost of construction. Id. at 300-05.
219. Id. at 305. A publicly announced price reduction would have been fruitless. Competitors
would have immediately met the price reduction, and, since demand was inelastic, the same
amount of wallboard would have been sold at lower prices. Id.; see note 133 supra.
220. 326 F. Supp. at 306.
221. See pt. 111(A) supra.
222. 326 F. Supp. at 309. Even when buyers did produce support it was often erroneous. Id.
Buyers also fraudulently took advantage of "job price protection" terms. Under job price
protection a supplier would agree to provide a customer, at a fixed price, a sufficient quantity of
wallboard to complete a particular project. Buyers often obtained job price protection for one
project from more than one supplier. Id. at 308. This is quite similar to the fraudulent acts of the
contractors in Cement Manufacturers. See text accompanying notes 152-56 supra.
223. 326 F. Supp. at 309. Only certain officers of each seller made verification calls. When
the officer placed a verification call he stated the reported price, the reporting customer, asked if
it was true or false, and the competitor would then reply. No other comment or discussion of
19781
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
after all other means of verifying the reported offers had been exhausted.2 24
The verification calls retarded the downward spiral of prices, 225 a stabiliz-
ing effect on prices which would have been sufficient under Container to
warrant liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act.226 The court, however,
interpreted Container's distinction of Cement Manufacturers as permitting the
exchange of price information, even if it results in the stabilization of prices,
so long as a controlling circumstance is present. 227 The court found two
controlling circumstances present in the verification calls, either of which
alone could have exempted the defendants from liability. 228 First, the defen-
dants' purpose of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act "constitut[ed] a
circumstance equally as compelling and controlling as that found in Ce-
ment."'229 Second, the protection against fraudulent misrepresentation by
customers was "precisely the purpose" of the exchange of information in
Cement Manufacturers.230 Wall Products seems to suggest that a finding of a
lawful purpose ends the inquiry into liability under the Sherman Act 2 3 1
prices took place. If the seller requesting verification did not have a specific price or customer and
merely inquired as to prices in general, the request was refused. Id. at 309 & n.6, 310.
224. Id. at 310. These other means included comparison of the report with other reports from
the same area, confidence in the veracity of the reporting customer, and written evidence of the
offer either seen or sent in by field salesman. Id. at 310-tli. The court made no reference to
inferring the reliability of a report from a termination in purchases, a verification method used in
other cases. See pt. Ifl(BX2) supra. The court's earlier Di-H4'al opinion made no reference to the
seller's exhausting all other means of verification before resorting to interseller verification.
The court in Wall Products did not indicate how many verification calls were made, stating
only that the number of sales increased as the number of price discounts increased. 326 F. Supp.
at 310..This number was apparently quite substantial. See id. at 306. In Di-Wal, however, the
number of calls averaged fewer than two ayear. Di-Wal, Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp., 1970 Trade Cas.
73,155, at 88,557 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1970).
225. 326 F. Supp. at 311.
226. See text accompanying note 180 supra. With the exception of United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560), the
interseller price verification cases were decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens
& Southern, discussed in text accompanying notes 181-213 supra.
227. 326 F. Supp. at 312-13; see text accompanying note 162 supra.
228. 326 F. Supp. at 312-15. The defendants were, however, found guilty on a separate
charge of price fixing. Id. at 328.
229. Id. at 313. The controlling circumstance present in Cement Manufacturers was the
protection of sellers from fraudulent deliveries under specific job contracts. See text accompany-
ing note 162 supra.
230. 326 F. Supp. at 315. The court could have found a controlling circumstance based upon
the similarities between the fraud in the specific job contracts in Cement Manufacturers and that
in the job price protection terms in the gypsum industry. See note 222 supra. Instead, the court
chose to broaden the fraud controlling circumstance of Cement Manufacturers to include the bad
faith bargaining of the gypsum dealers. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1242. The
purpose of the exchanges in Container, however, was also to verify lower prices reported by
untrustworthy buyers. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 28, 59, 61
(M.D.N.C. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Thus, the Supreme Court's invalidation of the
exchange in Container renders the Wall Products broad reading of the fraud exception question-
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2. The Gasoline Price War Cases
The next three decisions to consider interseller price verification for pur-
poses of compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act also found no Sherman
Act liability. 23 2 Each involved a major oil company, in the course of a
gasoline price war, verifying reports of lower prices before granting a tempo-
rary discount to its local retailer. 233 These decisions distinguished Container
in that the oil companies' exchange of information was not made pursuant to
an agreement234 and did not have a stabilizing effect on price.23s In addition,
the oil companies and their retailers had contracts under which the retailers
were required to buy from the oil companies at a set price, while in Container
the defendants competed for customers.236 The gasoline price war cases,
relying to varying degrees on Wall Products, found that the defendants'
purpose of complying with the meeting competition defense absolved them of
liability.237 Unlike Wall Products, however, several of the cases did not
indicate that the defendants had first exhausted all other means of verification
before contacting their competitors. 238 In addition there was no evidence that
able. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 11S, 123 n.9 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560); What Happened, supra note 9, at 662-63.
231. The court seemed to equate controlling circumstance with lawful purpose in the
following language: "The 'controlling circumstance' distinguishing Cement Manufacturers from
Container was the purpose of the exchange of price information by the sellers. In Cement
Manufacturers the purpose of the exchange was to protect against fraudulent misrepresentations
by buyers. In Container there was no such justification by way of purpose, since the defendants
did not seek to justify their exchange of price information as a means of protecting against fraud
by buyers, compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act or any other similar lawful purpose." 326
F. Supp. at 314 (emphasis added).
232. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943
(1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972);
Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248, 251-52 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
233. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943
(1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972);
Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248, 251 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
234. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943
(1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972).
In Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1971), the court did not indicate
whether it found an agreement to exchange information. The gasoline price war cases have been
criticized for focusing on the showing of a traditional agreement rather than upon Container's
emphasis on reciprocity. See What Happened, supra note 9, at 659-60 & n.84.
235. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 181-82 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928
(1972). While the plaintiffs in Gray v. Shell Oil Co. alleged a stabilization in price, the court did
not mention whether this had occurred. Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co. also did not discuss the
effect on prices.
236. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 181-82 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928
(1972).
237. Id. at 182; Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248, 251-52 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
Gray v. Shell Oil Co. did not cite Wall Products, but did cite Belliston t'. Texaco, Inc., which had
relied on Wall Products. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 943 (1973).
238. Only the Gray court indicated that all other means of verification had first been
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the retailers had misrepresented competing offers. The absence of these two
factors indicated a broadening of the Wall Products reading of Container.
239
3. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
Following the Wall Products decision the Government initiated a criminal
investigation into the gypsum wallboard industry which culminated in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co. 240 The Government, alleging that broad
discussions of present and future pricing policies occurred, 24 1 contended that
the purpose of the verification calls was to stabilize the downward trend in
prices. 24 2 As in Wall Products, defendants asserted that their only purpose
was to obtain reliable information on buyers' reports of competing offers in
order to comply with the good faith standard of the meeting competition
defense. 243 The trial court instructed the jury that even if the purpose of the
verification calls was to comply with the meeting competition defense, the
defendants had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act if the effect of the
exchange of price information was to stabilize prices. 244 The jury returned
guilty verdicts against four of the manufacturers and three corporate
officers. 245
exhausted. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943
(1973). The court did not, however, mention what these other means were. In Belliston, the
verified prices were publicly available. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 181 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972). Ironically, the court used this fact to show that reciprocity was
not present and thus no agreement could be found. Id. In each case, the fact that more than one
dealer reported competing prices could have been used to infer the reliability of the reported
prices. See pt. II(BX1) supra.
239. See Eaton, supra note 9, at 429; Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1243. In United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 125 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52
(1977) (No. 76-1560), the latest interseller price verification case, the Third Circuit expressly
disapproved of this broadening. See text accompanying notes 259-60 infra.
240. 550 F. 2d 115 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560). After an
indictment was returned in 1973 the defendants argued in the district court that the Government
had deliberately postponed empanelling the grand jury to await the Wall Products decision. They
moved for dismissal claiming that the unreasonable pre-indictment delay had worked a denial of
due process. The motion was denied by the trial court and affirmed on appeal. United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 383 F. Supp. 462 (W.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d
115 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560).
241. 550 F.2d at 120. This was contrary to the finding of the court in Wall Products. See note
223 supra.
242. 550 F.2d at 120.
243. Compare id. at 120 with Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295,
311 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The frequency of the calls was also disputed. The Government claimed
that the calls occurred daily until 1973, while the defendants alleged that the calls were limited in
scope and number. In addition, the defendants claimed that. other than in a few isolated cases,
the calls had been discontinued before the start of the applicable statute of limitations. 550 F.2d
at 120.
244. 550 F.2d at 120-21. This, of course, is the Container standard. See text accompanying
note 180 supra.
245. 550 F.2d at 117-18 & nn.2-4. The jury verdict does not necessarily mean that an effect
on prices was found. The jury could have found that the purpose of the verification calls was not
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On appeal, the Third Circuit found the jury instructions erroneous and
reversed the convictions. 24 6 The court, virtually ignoring Citizens & South-
ern, 24 7 viewed Container's distinction of Cement Manufacturers as permitting
an exchange of information that had a stabilizing effect on prices, so long as a
controlling circumstance is present. 24 8 Interpreting the phrase "controlling
circumstances" broadly, the Gypsum court did not regard it as limited to the
facts of Cement Manufacturers. 249 The Gypsum court concluded that, in this
case, the use of interseller price verification to comply with the Robinson-
Patman Act was in the best interests of competition and should be considered
a controlling circumstance.
25 0
In reaching its conclusion, the court observed that defendants had reason-
able doubt as to the veracity of the buyer's report of a competing price and
could not obtain reliable information by other means. 25 1 If interseller price
verification were prohibited, a defendant who lowered his price to a buyer
would be unable to raise a meeting competition defense to a price discrimina-
tion charge, since by cutting his price on the basis of an unreliable report the
seller would not have acted in good faith. 252 The Government suggested that,
to comply with the Robinson-Patman Act but rather to fix prices, thereby requiring a guilty
verdict regardless of the effect on prices.
246. Id. at 121. Judge Weis dissented on this point. Id. at 134-36 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge
Hunter, author of the courts opinion, also voted to reverse for imprecise jury instructions on the
purpose of, and withdrawal from, the conipiracy. Id. at 127-30 & n. 11. Another judge voted to
reverse for failure to declare a mistrial after the jury was deadlocked. Id. at 130-34 (Adams, J.,
concurring).
247. The Gypsum court cited Citizens & Southern only for the proposition that exchanges of
price information are not per se illegal. Id. at 123 n.9.
248. Id. at 123.
249. Id.
250. A threshold question exists as to whether Container did, in fact, dispose of Robinson-
Patman Act compliance as a controlling circumstance. The issue was not raised in the lower
court, apparently because the Container defendants on occasion were beating competition and not
just meeting it. Note, The Robinson-Patman Meeting of Competition Defense as Used in a
Sherman, Section 1, Conspiracy Action, 25 Baylor L. Rev. 357, 364 (1973). The defendants
argued before the Supreme Court, however, that a per se rule of liability for exchanges of price
information would conflict with the verification requirement of the meeting competition defense.
Brief for Appellees at 42-43, United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
None of the three opinions in the Supreme Court's decision of Container, however, referred to the
Robinson-Patman Act. The gypsum industry cases have concluded, based on this omission, that
Container does not preclude compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act as a defense to a
Sherman Act charge. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d at 123 n.9 (The
Court did not deal with [the Robinson-Patman Act]."); Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co.,
326 F. Supp. 295, 312 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Nevertheless, the possibility exists that Contairner sub
silentio decided any conflict between the Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Act in favor of
the latter. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d at 135 (Weis, J., dissenting);
cf. Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 161, 177 (1970) (Container "rejected [the
Robinson-Patman Act assertion] out of hand."). See generally 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113, 124
n.87 (1977).
251. See 550 F.2d at 121.
252. See pt. Ill(AX2) supra.
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in lieu of the discriminatory price cut, defendants could either cut prices to all
buyers or simply not make any price cuts. 25 3 The court rejected the first
option since it was not likely that a seller would make an across-the-board
price cut merely to close a single sale. 254 The Government's second option was
equally unacceptable to the court since it would "put a floor under prices" and
thereby contribute to the price rigidity of oligopolistic industries. 2 5 Instead,
the court elected to permit interseller price verification, enabling the defen-
dants to use a meeting competition defense and make price cuts to individual
buyers. The court viewed this as a desirable result since "it is through isolated
price reductions that established price levels [in concentrated industries] are
eroded, precipitating widespread price cuts. "256
Unlike the courts in prior interseller price verification cases, however, the
Gypsum court recognized the ease with which an interseller price verification
system could evolve into covert price fixing. 2 7 Accordingly, it rejected the
defendants' suggestion that interseller price verification for purposes of com-
plying with the Robinson-Patman Act always constitutes a controlling cir-
cumstance. 25 8 The Gypsum court expressly disapproved of the gasoline price
war cases which had permitted interseller price verification in cases where
there was no evidence that buyers misrepresented the amount of competing
offers or that alternative means of verification were unavailable. 2S9 The court
viewed these cases as an unnecessary dilution of the Sherman Act. 260
Even in a case where the seller had exhausted all other means of corrob-
oration, the court restricted the use of interseller price verification. In the
court's view, if the seller's investigation indicated no reason to doubt the
buyer's reliability, then the seller's duty under the meeting competition
defense would be complete. In such a case the seller would not have to verify
the buyer's report with his competitor before lowering his price to the
buyer. 261 The court used section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act to bolster its
253. 550 F.2d at 124.
254. Id. (citing 1955 Attorney General's Report, supra note 18, at 181).
255. Id. at 124.
256. Id. (citing P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 231 (1974)).
257. Id. at 124.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 125; accord, id. at 136. (Weis, J., dissenting). The court overlooked, however, the
fact that alternate means of verification had been exhausted in one of these cases. See note 238
supra.
260. Id. at 125. In criticizing these decisions, the Gypsum court noted the Supreme Court's
suggestion in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 69 (1953), that the Robinson-Patman
Act should yield to the Sherman Act when the two statutes conflict. 550 F.2d at 125. At issue In
Canteen was whether, in a proceeding brought under § 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, the
FTC or the buyer had the burden of proving evidence on the seller's costs in order to show that
the seller's price was not discriminatory. 346 U.S. at 62-63; see pt. VI(B)(1) infra. The Supreme
Court declined to put the burden on the buyer since, inter alia, "it would almost inevitably
require a degree of cooperation between buyer and seller, as against other buyers, that may
offend other antitrust policies." 346 U.S. at 69.
261. 550 F.2d at 126.
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conclusion. Since section 2(f)'s standard of buyer liability deters buyers from
misrepresenting competing offers, a buyer's report of a lower offer can be
given greater credibility. 262
The court concluded that only in the event that the seller's investigation or
previous experience indicated good reason to doubt the buyer's reliability
could the seller verify the reported price with his competitor. 263 The court
stated that "[i]f the seller could discriminate in price when he had good
reason to believe that the buyer . . was lying about a competitor's
supposedly lower offer, then the 'good faith' requirement of section 2(b) would
be rendered nugatory." 264 The court then summarized its analysis by
enumerating the four factors that must be present before it would permit
interseller price verification:
(1) the [defendants must have] engaged in the practice solely to comply with the
strictures of Robinson-Patman;
(2) they had first resorted to all other reasonable means of corroboration, without
success;
(3) they had good, independent reason to doubt the buyers' truthfulness; and
(4) their communication with competitors was strictly limited to the one price and one
buyer at issue.
265
Judge Weis, dissenting, viewed the factual similarity between Container and
Gypsum as fatal to defendants' case. 266 He argued that considerations of
262. See id. As an example, the court referred to Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969),
affd sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971),
discussed in pt. III(B)(3) supra. Beatrice had attempted to corroborate Kroger's report of lower
prices, but did not contact its competitors. The FTC absolved Beatrice from liability because it
acted in good faith; it had no reason to disbelieve Kroger. But Kroger was held liable under § 2(f)
because it had knowingly induced a discriminatory price. See text accompanying notes 117-24
supra. Prior to the Kroger decision it was thought that a buyer could not have violated § 2(f) if the
seller had been absolved of liability under § 2(a). See pt. VI(B)X2) infra.
263. 550 F.2d at 126. As an example, the court referred to Wall Products. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. This is essentially the test recommended in LaRue, supra note 9, at 340.
266. 550 F.2d at 135 (Weis, J., dissenting). Both the corrugated container and gypsum
wallboard industries were homogeneous oligopolies where price was the principal basis of
competition. See text accompanying notes 165-66, 217 supra. Judge Weis observed that in both
industries buyers misrepresented reports of competing offers and that sellers verified these reports
with each other only after exhausting all other means of verification. In addition, in neither case
was the information distributed to buyers or the public. 550 F.2d at 135 (Weis, J., dissenting). In
some respects Judge Weis felt that Gypsum presented a stronger case for a Sherman Act violation
than did Container. The gypsum manufacturers did not deny that they had agreed to verify
prices, while the Supreme Court in Container was forced to infer an agreement from the
reciprocity of the exchange. See note 167 supra. There was also a dispute as to the effect on prices
in Container. See text accompanying notes 177-79 supra. In Gypsum, however, the jury verdict
established that the interseller verification had an effect on prices. 550 F.2d at 135 (Weis, J.,
dissenting). But see note 245 supra.
The majority in Gypsum agreed that the purpose of the exchange in Container was to combat
the bad faith bargaining of buyers. The majority also acknowledged that Container refused to
equate this bad faith bargaining with the fraud in Cement Afanufactuers. S5O F.2d at 123 n.9.
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motive, such as compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, are irrelevant if a
defendant is found to have stabilized prices.2 67 Moreover, he did not interpret
the good faith standard of the meeting competition defense as requiring an
investigation that results in price fixing or any other illegal activity. 26 8
B. Analysis
1. The Interseller Price Verification Cases and the Citizens & Southern and
Container Standards
As noted before, the rule of reason standard of Citizens & Southern is the
preferable method of determining the legality of exchanges of price informa-
tion among competitors. 269 Nevertheless, lower courts continue to ignore
Citizens & Southern and look only to Container.270 In addition, with the
exception of Gypsum, the interseller price verification cases were decided prior
to Citizens & Southern. Thus, an analysis of these cases in light of both the
Citizens & Southern and Container standards is required.
a. Wall Products
The treatment of the exchanges of price information in Wall Products is
inconsistent with both Citizens & Southern and Container. Once the Wall
Products court found that the defendants' purpose in verifying prices was to
comply with the Robinson-Patman Act, it concluded, without further analy-
sis, that a controlling circumstance was present, thereby precluding Sherman
Act liability. The court's failure to determine the procompetitive effects of
Robinson-Patman compliance and weigh them against the stabilization of
prices renders Wall Products incompatible with the balancing test of Citizens
& Southern.
The court in Wall Products interpreted Containers failure to discuss
purpose as suggesting that an exchange of information for any lawful purpose
constitutes a controlling circumstance. 27 1 The court overlooked, however, the
fact that the purpose of the exchange in Container was to verify unreliable
customer reports of lower prices. 272 Though such a purpose, standing alone,
was lawful, the Supreme Court nevertheless declared the exchange of infor-
mation illegal. Container's omission of a discussion of purpose indicates that
(Implicit in this statement by the Gypsum court is a criticism of the Wall Products broadening of
the Cement Manufacturers fraud exception. See note 230 supra.) Nevertheless, the Gypsum
majority framed the problem before it, not as fraud, but rather compliance with the Robinson-
Patman Act, an issue which the Supreme Court had not dealt with in Container. 550 F.2d at 123.
267. 550 F.2d at 135-36 (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)). The majority, however, interpreted Containers distinction of Cement
Manufacturers as indicating that a defendant's purpose in exchanging price information Is not
always irrelevant. 550 F.2d at 123.
268. 550 F.2d at 135 (Weis, J., dissenting).
269. See text accompanying notes 206-13 supra.
270. See cases cited note 205 supra.
271. See note 231 supra.
272. See text accompanying notes 167-68 supra.
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the purpose of the exchange is irrelevant when its effect is to stabilize prices.
Arguably, that Court's distinction of Cement Manufacturers because of the
presence of a controlling circumstance is compatible with the view that
purpose is not always irrelevant. 273 That is, however, a strained reading of
the phrase "controlling circumstance." The Court did not intend "to expand
the holding of Cement Manufacturers, but rather to confine it.1274 The




Gypsum, then, must also be inconsistent with Container. Following the lead
of the Wall Products decision, the Gypsum court read the use of the term
controlling circumstance as an indication that purpose is not irrelevant.2 7 6
The court then classified Robinson-Patman compliance as a controlling cir-
cumstance, immunizing the defendants from liability despite the stabilizing
effect on prices. Of course, Wall Products and Gypsum could be distinguished
from Container in that Robinson-Patman compliance was not at issue in
Container.27 7 Nevertheless, these decisions are difficult to harmonize with a
literal reading of the modified per se standard of Container.
Gypsum is consistent, however, with the rule of reason standard. Unlike
Wall Products, the Gypsum inquiry did not classify Robinson-Patman com-
pliance as a controlling circumstance simply because it was lawful. Instead,
the Gypsum court, in a fashion similar to that of Citizens & Southern, based
its decision upon the overall effect on competition. Both cases permitted an
exchange of information that resulted in a lack of price competition in order to
foster other procompetitive results. In Citizens & Southern, the branch
banking that led to the exchange of information was determined to be
procompetitive.2 7 8 In Gypsum, the court felt that interseller price verification
would encourage isolated price cuts that would erode the rigid price structure
of concentrated industries.279 In addition, the Gypsum court, recognizing the
dangers of interseller price verification, restricted its use to limited circum-
stances.
280
273. See Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 314 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
274. 550 F.2d at 136 (Weis, J., dissenting); see Kefauver, supra note 163, at 790-91.
275. The gasoline price war cases, discussed in pt. V(A)(2) supra, are troublesome in that the
agreement requirement of § I of the Sherman Act was not satisfied. In addition, these cases did
not find a stabilizing effect on prices and are therefore distinguishable from Container, Citizens &
Southern, and the two gypsum industry cases. Because, however, the gasoline price war cases
relied on Wail Products in permitting interseller price verification, the failure of Wall Products to
satisfy either the rule of reason or modified per se standard seriously undermines the validity of
these decisions. Furthermore, the Gypsum criticism of the gasoline price war cases based upon the
failure of the defendants to exhaust all other means of verification, see text accompanying note
260 supra, is well founded. The inherent danger of interseller price verification makes these cases
an unnecessary dilution of the Sherman Act. See pt. V(BX3) supra.
276. 550 F.2d at 123.
277. See note 250 supra.
278. See text accompanying notes 189-93 supra.
279. See text accompanying notes 251-56 supra.




It is evident that neither Wall Products nor Gypsum is reconcilable with a
literal application of the modified per se standard of Container, and only
Gypsum survives scrutiny under the Citizens & Southern rule of reason
standard. 28 1 It is regrettable that the Gypsum court, although using essentially
the same approach, virtually ignored Citizens &Southern.28 2 By treating
Container as the leading case in this area, the Gypsum court was forced to
pigeonhole Robinson-Patman compliance as a controlling circumstance in
order to avoid the harshness of Container's modified per se standard. Fortu-
nately, the Gypsum result is the same as would have been reached had
Citizens & Southern been followed. Nevertheless, it is hoped that courts in
the future will eliminate this meaningless inquiry into controlling circum-
stances and openly follow the rule of reason standard of Citizens & Southern.
2. Gypsum and the Standard of Good Faith in Section 2(b)
Gypsum's conclusion is also based upon a misinterpretation of the standard
of good faith necessary to obtain a meeting competition defense. Resort to
interseller price verification is not a prerequisite of that defense, Thus, a
prohibition of interseller verification would not have eliminated the
availability of the defense for the Gypsum defendants.
Gypsum is correct in stating that a seller, unable to corroborate a buyer's
report of a competing offer, must investigate the buyer's reliability, for the
buyer is a commercial antagonist of the seller and should never be presumed
to have given reliable information. 28 3 Such an investigation either will or will
not reveal good reason to doubt the buyer. If the investigation reveals good
reason to doubt the buyer, then Gypsum states that the seller must verify the
report with his competitor if he wishes to lower his price. 28 4 But why should
the seller be allowed to contact his competitor, a practice Gypsum admitted
has significant anticompetitive effect potential, 285 if he knows the report is
unreliable? If the seller has good reason to believe that the buyer is lying,
there is no need to meet a competing price since the competing price
probably does not exist.28 6 Gypsum is in this respect illogical.
281. Gypsum has been criticized as contrary to the suggestion made in Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 69, 74 (1953), that when the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act
conflict, the Robinson-Patman Act should give way. See 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113, 130 (1977);
BNA Analysis, supra note 21, at B-3. See also LaRue, supra note 9, at 338. Such a wooden test Is
inferior to the Gypsum court's use of what was in essence a rule of reason standard. It should also
be remembered that the Gypsum court was cognizant of Automatic Canteen and accordingly
restricted the use of interseller price verification. See note 255 supra and accompanying text.
282. See note 247 supra.
283. See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
284. See text accompanying notes 263-65 supra.
285. See text accompanying notes 257-60 supra.
286. If the buyer's report turns out to be true, the seller will, of course, have lost a sale. But
such a termination of sales could be used to infer the reliability of the buyer's report and the seller
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Of course, a seller who has good reason to doubt the buyer's reliability may
still wish to cut his price to the buyer in order to obtain an extra sale. But as
Gypsum correctly points out, the seller who cuts his price on unreliable
information would not be acting in good faith. Such a seller should not be
permitted to maintain a meeting competition defense to a charge of price
discrimination.
If the seller's investigation does not reveal good reason to doubt the buyer,
then Gypsum states that the seller's duty is complete. Nothing else is required
since the seller's good faith belief is that a competing offer exists. But if the
seller knows that buyers have lied in the past, as was the case in the gypsum
industry, then Gypsum again requires a seller wishing to lower his price to
verify the reported price with his competitor. 28 7 In this case, Gypsum in effect
requires the seller to have positive proof of a competing offer, a standard
clearly contrary to FTC v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,288 which stated
that section 2(b) "does not require the seller to justify price discriminations by
showing that in fact they met a competitive price. ' 2 89 The seller's burden is
only to show that the discriminatory price cut was made in good faith to meet
a competing price. 290 A seller whose investigation of a buyer's report of a
competing offer indicates no reason to believe the buyer is lying, despite the
buyer's past reputation for misrepresenting competing offers, would seem to
have acted in good faith if he lowers his price. 29' As the FTC has noted, good
faith "is a flexible and pragmatic, not technical or doctrinaire, concept. The
standard of good faith is simply the standard of the prudent businessman
responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a situation of competitive
necessity. '292 This fair response should not be interpreted as requiring an
exchange of price information among oligopolists, which, as discussed below,
has a significant anticompetitive effect. 293
could subsequently make a price cut in order to regain his lost business. See International Air
Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cet. denied, 424 U.S. 943
(1976), discussed in pt. II(BX2) supra. Theoretically, in such circumstances the seller would only
have lost one sale.
287. See text accompanying notes 263-65 supra.
288. 324 U.S. 746 (1945), discussed in text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
289. Id. at 759; see Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1964), cmt.
denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965). No case prior to Gypsum had required the seller to contact his
competitors in order to establish a meeting competition defense. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra
note 7, at 1243-44.
290. 324 U.S. at 759.
291. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 726 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976), discussed in pt. I(BX2) supra.
292. Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963).
293. See pt. V(BX3) infra. It is also questionable whether the seller's competitor is in fact a
reliable source of information. Competing sellers are, of course, commercial antagonists just as
are the buyer and seller, and unreliable information is to be expected of commercial antagonists.
See pt. 1I1(A) supra. It would seem to the competitors advantage to lie to another seller
requesting verification and deny that he has offered a lower price to a buyer. By doing so the
competitor will have prevented the seller from offering an equally low price, which could deprive
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It should be noted, however, that the traditional meet not beat requirement of
the meeting competition defense, which prohibits the seller from undercutting
competition, 294 complicates the problem. A seller, wary of this requirement, and
despite his complete good faith, will still be inhibited from lowering his price
unless he can obtain the exact amount of a competitor's price. Thus, a prohibi-
tion of interseller price verification, in the context of a strict meet not beat
requirement, would increase price rigidity. The meet not beat requirement is
not, however, "draconian."2 95 Recent decisions, emphasizing the seller's good
faith effort to meet competition, have permitted meeting competition defenses
even though the seller's price reduction in fact undercut competition. 296 This
liberal reading of the meet not beat requirement is to be encouraged, for an overly
literal application permits sellers to match prices, thereby increasing price uni-
formity.2 97
3. Interseller Price Verification and Competition
Once the erroneous conclusion ofGypsum-that interseller price verification is
necessary to establish a meeting competition defense-is set aside, it becomes
obvious that, even under the rule of reason standard, the practice should be
prohibited. The possibilities for abuse of interseller price verification are sub-
stantial. 298 The Department of Justice fears it is "becoming a cover for hard core
price-fixing agreements." 299 Even the Gypsum court noted that it could lead to "a
broad range of data dissemination schemes and communications among compe-
titors, which might provide camouflage for illegitimate agreements. 30 0 Gypsum
attempted to limit the possibilities of abuse by making its four-part test 30 as
"narrow" as possible. 30 2 Despite this, the Gypsum test has already drawn un-
favorable commentary. 30 3 It is also difficult to imagine how the Department of
the competitor of a sale. See Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1491. Thus, a competitor who
accurately answers the seller's verification call will not be acting as a commercial antagonist.
Instead, he could be acting in conjunction with the seller in an effort to match prices and halt a
downward trend in prices. Id.; see pt. V(B)(3) infra. The purpose of an effective price verification
system would seem to be the establishment of a collusive pricing policy rather than compliance
with the Robinson-Patman Act.
294. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
295. Galanti, Buyer Liability for Inducing or Receiving Discriminatory Prices, Terms, and
Promotional Allowances: Caveat Emptor in the 1970's, 7 Ind. L. Rev. 962, 979 n.72 (1974).
296. See cases cited note 57 supra.
297. Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1485-87.
298. See Eaton, supra note 9, at 427; Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1243-44; 1977
Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 58-63.
299. 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 59.
300. 550 F.2d at 124. The Government's argument in Gypsum had focused on this point. It
contended that the verification calls were made daily and involved broad discussions of present
and future pricing. See text accompanying notes 241-42 supra.
301: See text accompanying note 265 supra.
302. 550 F.2d at 126; see id. at 134 (Adams, J., concurring) (sellers face a difficult task in
proving that interseller price verification does not constitute price fixing).
303. One commentator feels that all sellers will claim that their sole purpose was to comply
with the Robinson-Patman Act. BNA Analysis, supra note 21, at B-3. But see 46 Geo. Wash. L.
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Justice could effectively monitor the legality of verification calls without
wiretaps or some other form of continual surveillance, a result that should not be
encouraged.
But even an interseller price verification system that meets the Gypsum test, as
in Wall Products,30 4 is anticompetitive in an oligopolistic market. The off-list
price discounts in the gypsum industry were a procompetitive force in that they
disrupted the pricing discipline of the sellers. As each seller became uncertain of
his rivals' pricing decisions, the price discounts spread and initiated a downward
trend in prices. 30 S Interseller price verification, however, eliminated the uncer-
tainty by enabling sellers to determine the exact amount of competitors'
prices. 30 6 The seller could confidently quote a price equal to that of this
competitor. 30 7 He would be foolish to name a lower price since this would
only fuel the downward spiral of prices. 308 That interseller price verification
permits sellers to reinstall a uniform price structure is indicated by the
stabilization of prices which occurred in the Wall Products situation. 30 9
Interseller price verification also has an anticompetitive effect at the secondary
line of competition. A buyer who has received a secret price cut will be in a
favored position relative to other buyers; normally, this discrimination would be
only temporary. 3 10 As the number of price cuts increases, the pricing discipline of
the oligopolists will collapse. 311 Eventually price discounts would be so wide-
Rev. 113, 134 (1977) ("Such singleness of purpose is extremely difficult to prove."). In addition,
sellers could easily assert a lack of other means of corroboration and good reason to doubt the
buyer's reliability. BNA Analysis, supra note 21, at B-3; 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113, 134 (1977).
Sellers could also circumvent the limitation of the discussion in the calls to the one price and one
buyer at issue by placing a series of verification calis that would in effect amount to a constant
price monitoring system. For example, although the calls in Wall Products complied with this
limitation, they were apparently made on a frequent basis. See note 224 supra.
304. The Wall Products court found that the purpose of the verification calls was to comply
with the Robinson-Patman Act; that the defendants had exhausted other means of corroboration;
that the defendants' previous experience gave them good reason to doubt the buyers' veracity, and
that the calls were limited to the one price and one buyer at issue. See text accompanying notes
221-24 supra.
305. See text accompanying note 220 supra.
306. Cf. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1969) (Fortas,
J., concurring) ("[Tihe exchange of prices made it possible for individual defendants confidently to
name a price equal to that which their competitors were asking.").
307. In fact, if the seller offered a lower price he would violate the meet not beat requirement
of the meeting competition defense because he knew the exact amount of his competitors offer.
See text accompanying note 55 supra.
308. Testimony from Wall Products is evidence of this: "Mr. Harper, of Kaiser, when asked
why he answered verification calls, said, 'If you don't tell him you are giving [the customer] $2
off, he might give [the customer] three.' And Mr. Atwell, of National, said he answered
verification questions, so that a competitor would not meet an inaccurate price, thus forcing
National to meet the new price . Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp.
295, 311 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
309. See id. at 311.
310. See Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1482 n.39. But see text accompanying notes
395-97 infra.
311. See note 4 supra.
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spread that prices will be lower to all buyers. 3 12 Interseller price verification,
however, allows sellers to match price cuts and freeze the downward trend of
prices. If the prices are frozen at a level where some buyers are still in a favored
position, the initial discrimination will become permanent, 31 3 perhaps forcing
some buyers out of the market.
Gypsum then, despite its restriction of interseller price verification, did not
go far enough. The practice has an anticompetitive effect at both the primary
and secondary lines of competition. Moreover, as noted before, 3 14 the good
faith standard of the meeting competition defense does not require interseller
price verification. The seller should be allowed to lower his price if his
investigation does not reveal good reason to doubt the buyer's reliability. As is
always the case with the good faith standard, however, the seller's investiga-
tion may not always detect the unreliability of a particularly shrewd buyer.
3 15
This problem is discussed below.
VI. BUYER RELIABILITY
A. Section 2(t) of the Robinson-Patman Act
The previous discussion has focused on the liability of the seller. Yet it is
the buyer who creates most of the seller's problems. By playing different
sellers off against each other, perhaps even lying about competing offers, the
buyer causes great uncertainty on the seller's side of the marketplace. This
uncertainty gives rise to the interseller price verification systems which enable
sellers to obtain positive proof of competing offers before discriminating in
price. 316 As noted above, these systems are inherently anticompetitive and
unnecessary to the seller wishing to obtain a meeting competition defense to a
price discrimination charge. 3 17 If the seller's good faith investigation does not
indicate good reason to doubt the buyer's report of a competing offer, he
should be permitted to lower his price to the buyer. But if the seller's
investigation fails to detect that a buyer has misrepresented a competing offer,
then the seller who cuts his price will have undercut competition and not
merely met it. By obtaining a lower price, the lying buyer will have placed
himself in a favored position relative to other buyers, creating a discrimina-
tion at the secondary level of competition. 3 18 Thus, a prohibition of interseller
312. See Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1481. For example, in the gypsum industry
prior to the price verification calls, buyers were able to obtain numerous price discounts,
triggering a general downward trend in prices. See text accompanying note 220 supra.
313. See Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1486, 1493-94.
314. See pt. V(B)(2) supra.
315. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), affd sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC,
438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), discussed in pt. III(B)(3) supra and
pt. VI(BX2) infra.
316. See text accompanying note 288 supra.
317. See pts. V(B)(2), (3) supra.




price verification, which forces the seller to rely solely on his own investiga-
tion, has anticompetitive ramifications.
In order to alleviate this problem and yet avoid the anticompetitive dangers
of interseller price verification, several commentators have suggested an
increased use of section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act,31'9 which provides
that it is unlawful for the buyer "knowingly to induce or receive a discrimina-
tion in price" prohibited by section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.320 At
first glance such a suggestion has considerable merit. Increased enforcement
of section 2(f), with the concurrent increase in deterrence of fictitious reports
of competing offers, could lend added credence to a buyer's report of a
competing offer. 321 Buyer liability also seems more equitable than seller
liability. Since it is the buyer who creates the discrimination at the secondary
line of competition, it is only fair that he be held responsible for it. 322
As is often the case with the Robinson-Patman Act, 323 however, section
2(f)'s protection of competition at the secondary line has an anticompetitive
effect at the primary line. A buyer fearful of section 2(f) liability will bargain
less aggressively, encouraging inflexible and high prices by oligopolists. 3 24 By
exerting pressure for price discounts, aggressive buyers introduce a disruptive
element into the pricing patterns of oligopolists. 32s Because section 2(f) hinders
the beneficial effect of aggressive bargaining on rigid prices in oligopolies,
several proposed reforms of the Robinson-Patman Act have eliminated section
2(f) entirely. 32 6
319. See Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1495-97; 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113, 134
(1977). The Gypsum court recommended increased use of § 2(f) in addition to permitting
interseller price verification in certain circumstances. See text accompanying note 262 supra.
320. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970). See generally Curtis, Buyer Liability Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 42 Antitrust L.J. 345 (1973); Galanti, supra note 295; Note, The Evolving Duty of an
Innocent Buyer To Inquire into His Bargain Under Section 2(J)r of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49
Ind. L.J. 348 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Evolving Duty]. By apparent oversight, § 2(fi pertains
only to inducements of discrimination in price and not violations of §§ 2(d) and 2(e). E. Kintner.
supra note 6, at 252. Courts have used § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1970 & Supp. V 1975), to close this gap. See, e.g., Grand Union v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1962).
321. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d Cir.). cer.
granted, 98 S. CL 52 (1977) (No. 76-1560).
322. For a discussion of the seller's difficulties in bringing a tort action against the buyer to
recover the damages previously assessed against the seller under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, see Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 3, at 147 n.90.
323. See Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1214.
324. See 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 63.
325. 1955 Attorney General's Report, supra note 18, at 196. See generally J. Galbraith,
American Capitalism 111-14, 117-23 (1952); F. Scherer, supra note 3, at 239-52.
326. See 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 63-64, 293; Campbell & Emanuel, supra
note 3, at 208; cf. Neal Report, supra note 6, app. C, at 23-25 (restriction of § 2(f) in interests of
hard bargaining). The Department of Justice finds it "anomalous that a statute designed to
protect small businessmen has the effect of governing the competitive relationships between giant
companies for the benefit of those with oligopoly selling power." 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra
note 2, at 63.
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B. Judicial Interpretation of Section 2(t)
1. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC
The Supreme Court recognized the potential danger in section 2(f) in its
only interpretation of the statute, Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC.32 7 In
Automatic Canteen, the FTC asserted that proof that the buyer knew the
price received was discriminatory established a prima facie violation of
section 2(f). 3 28 The Court rejected this contention, stating:
[T]he Commission's view . . . might . . . help give rise to a price uniformity and
rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation.
[W]e are unable, in the light of congressional policy as expressed in other
antitrust legislation, to read this ambiguous language as putting the buyer at his peril
whenever he engages in price bargaining. Such a reading must be rejected in view of
the effect it might have on . . . sturdy bargaining between buyer and seller. 32 9
The Court interpreted section 2(f) as requiring that a buyer also know that
the price received was illegal. Thus, if the price received was "either within
one of the seller's defenses . . . or not known by [the buyer] not to be within
one of those defenses," no violation of section 2(f) had occurred. 330 The
Court's imposition of a two-tiered scienter requirement greatly inhibited the
use of section 2(f). 33 1
The Campbell and Emanuel proposal would retain buyer liability if the buyer knowingly
makes misrepresentations in a signed writing that a seller relies upon to fulfill his duty to verify.
Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 3, at 205-06. See also LaRue, supra note 9, at 340 (buyer
affidavits).
327. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
328. Id. at 62-63.
329. Id. at 63, 73-74.
330. Id. at 74. The Court fashioned a rule of fairness and convenience to govern who had the
burden of proving that the buyer did not know that the price was illegal. As to cost justification,
because the FTC had better access to information concerning a seller's costs, it was the FTC's,
rather than the buyer's, burden to prove that the buyer knew a price was not cost justified. Id. at
78-79. In addition, requiring the buyer to prove the seller's costs would "require a degree of
cooperation between buyer and seller, as against other buyers, that may offend other antitrust
policies." Id. at 69. The Court suggested, however, that as to the meeting competition defense,
the burden of proving that a price was made to meet competition should be on the buyer since
information on competing offers was more readily available to the buyer. Id. at 79 n.23 (dictum).
331. Following Automatic Canteen the FTC did not bring a § 2(f) charge against an
individual buyer until Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F 2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968), some 13 years later. See Evolving Duty, supra note 320, at 357.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Automatic Canteen, had predicted that the majority's decision
would have such an "enervating effect" on the statute. 346 U.S. at 82. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In Fred Meyer the court held that a knowledgeable buyer may be charged with notice of the
illegality of the price if he receives a suspicious price and does not make inquiries as to its legality.
359 F.2d at 365-66; see Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (same result
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for inducing payments in violation of § 2(d) of
the Robinson-Patman Act).
INTERSELLER PRICE VERIFICATION
2. Kroger Co. v. FTC
Automatic Canteen dearly suggested that a buyer could not have violated
section 2(f) if the seller was absolved of liability under section 2(a). 332 In
Kroger Co. v. FTC, 333 however, the Sixth Circuit carved out an exception to
this rule in the case of a lying buyer. The court ruled that Kroger could be
held liable for its misrepresentations even after the seller, Beatrice Foods, had
obtained a meeting competition defense. 334 Justice Clark, speaking for the
court, stated:
[T]he seller's successful defense under § 2(b) cannot exculpate the buyer since Kroger
knew that the prices offered by Beatrice and received by Kroger were not in fact
within the defense of section 2(b). To hold otherwise in this case would put a premium
on the buyer's artifice and cunning in inducing discriminatory prices.... In order for
the buyer to be sheltered through the exoneration of the seller under section 2(b) the
prices induced must come within the defenses of that section not only from the seller's
point of view but also from that of the buyer. To hold otherwise would violate the
purposes of the Act, and frustrate the intent of the Congress. 3 "
The FTC decision below had used broad language in holding Kroger liable
and suggested that hard bargaining and the failure "to convey any correct
information about the price levels being quoted by others" may come within
the scope of section 2(f). 336 Justice Clark, however, took pains to base the
circuit court's decision upon Kroger's misrepresentations:
The use by the Commission of the "hard bargaining" language as well as the failure of
Kroger "to convey any correct information about the price levels being quoted by
others" is but a warning, not a command. The controlling point here is not the "hard
bargaining" nor the price levels" [sic] but the misrepresentation of the [competing) bid,
in order to induce a discriminatory price. 337
It is difficult to determine if other circuits have approved of Kroger's
departure from the general rule of Automatic Canteen that acquittal of the
seller immunizes the buyer from liability. In United Fruit Co., 338 the buyer,
332. Many commentators had adopted this view of Automatic Canteen. See Galanti, supra
note 295, at 975-76 & n.55.
333. 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1971), affg Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), discussed in pt. III(B)(3) supra.
334. Id. at 1377.
335. Id. (citation omitted).
336. The FTC had stated: "Kroger bargained too hard-.., it did not have a sufficient
regard for its Robinson-Patman obligations. If a buyer chooses to use its bargaining power to get
favored treatment from its suppliers, it is permitted to do so under the law .... At some point,
however, if the buyer continues to push, he must become liable if Robinson-Patman bounds are
exceeded ...
".... [Kroger] went beyond the bounds of permissible bargaining.., when [itJfailed to convey
any correct information about the price levels being quoted by others." Beatrice Foods Co., 76
F.T.C. 719, 818-19 (1969), affd sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
337. 438 F.2d at 1378.
338. 82 F.T.C. 53 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Harbor Banana Distribs., Inc. v. FTC 499 F.2d
395 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Harbor Banana, threatened its supplier, United Fruit, that it would change
suppliers unless United delivered directly to Harbor's plant. 339 After United
refused, Harbor transferred fifteen-percent of its business to one of United's
competitors, whereupon United provided a special delivery service to Har-
bor.340 The FTC found United in violation of section 2(a) for providing this
discriminatory delivery service, and Harbor in violation of section 2(f) for
inducing the service. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, without mentioning
Kroger, set aside the FTC's finding of section 2(f) liability for the buyer after
the court had ruled that the seller was entitled to a meeting comptition
defense. 34 1 Citing Automatic Canteen, the court stated that "[a] prohibited
discrimination is a condition precedent to a finding of unlawful conduct under
§ 2(f)." 34 2 Still, Harbor Banana can be distinguished from Kroger by reason of
the absence of buyer misrepresentation. 343
The Ninth Circuit's position is similarly unclear. In Rutledge v. Electric
Hose and Rubber Co., 344 another case distinguishable from Kroger because of
the absence of active misrepresentation on the part of the buyer, 345 the district
court, citing Automatic Canteen and not Kroger, stated that since the seller
had not violated section 2(a), it "must logically follow that ... [the buyer has]
not violated § 2(f)."'346 The Ninth Circuit affirmed with neither qualification
nor reference to any authority, 34 7 an odd result considering the fact that in an
earlier case the Ninth Circuit itself had stated that a buyer who "knowingly
manipulate[s] the competitive bidding through false or disingenuous reporting
of competitor's [sic] bids" can be held liable under section 2(f) even if the seller
has obtained a meeting competition defense. 348
339. Id. at 146.
340. Harbor Banana Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 499 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1974).
341. Id. at 399.
342. Id. Judge Griffin Bell wrote the Harbor Banana opinion, which places the Attorney
General and the Solicitor General, Wade McCree, Jr., who participated in the Kroger decision
while serving on the Sixth Circuit, on opposite sides of this issue.
343. An argument could be made that buyer misrepresentation was present in Harbor
Banana. In finding § 2(f) liability the FTC had relied, inter alia, on Harbor's threat to switch
suppliers unless it was granted the discriminatory concession. The FTC classified this threat as
"an effort to procure a price concession ... rather than a bona fide statement of its intentions."
United Fruit Co., 82 F.T.C. 53, 146 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Harbor Banana Distribs., Inc. v.
FTC, 499 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1974). This would seem, however, closer to hard bargaining than
the active misrepresentation of a competitor's bid that was present in Kroger. Evolving Duty,
supra note 308, at 362. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit's opinion does not discuss this point.
344. 327 F. Supp. 1267 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975).
345. In Rutledge, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant seller sold to the defendant buyers
at a price less than the plaintiffs were charged. Id. at 1274. Rutledge is also distinguishable from
Kroger in that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case in their § 2(a) allegation against
the seller. Id. at 1275-76.
346. Id. at 1276.
347. Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 678 (9th Cir. 1975).
348. Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383, 386 n.2 (9th Cir. 1974) (dictum). For reasons
best known to itself, the court did not cite Kroger. It did, however, cite the FTC decision below.
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3. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC
Kroger stated that "[i]n order for the buyer to be sheltered through the
exoneration of the seller under [a meeting competition defense] the prices
induced must come within the" defense from the buyer's point of view in
addition to the seller's point of view.3 4 9 Thus, if the buyer knew that the
seller's price beat rather than met competition, the buyer could still be held
liable under section 2(f). In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 3S° the
Second Circuit extended the buyer's point of view rule from the buyer in
Kroger who misrepresented competing offers to a buyer who merely failed to
inform a seller that its bid beat, rather than met, a competitor's bid. In A &
P, the seller, Borden Co.,offered A & P a bid for the supply of private label
milk that would have reduced A & P's dairy costs by $410,000.3SI Unsatisfied,
A & P sought and received a bid from another supplier which would have
resulted in a savings of $737,000.3 s 2 A & P then notified Borden that its bid
was "not in the ball park" and that a $50,000 increase "would not be a drop in
the pocket."353 Borden, offered to double A & P's savings to $820,000,3S4
emphasizing that the only way it could justify the bid was on the basis of
meeting competition, i.e., the bid could in no way satisfy the cost justification
defense of section 2(a).3 s s A & P regarded this bid as "substantially better"
than the competing bid and accepted it.3S6
A & P was charged with violating.section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, as well as the policy of the Robinson-Patman Act, for failing to
inform Borden that its second bid had substantially beaten the competing bid
when it knew that Borden was relying upon the meeting competition defense.
The FTC, stating that the allegation was "directed to the question of what
must legally be disclosed during contract negotiations," dismissed the
charge.35 7 The FTC feared that the "imposition of a duty of affirmative
349. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); see text
accompanying note 336 supra.
350. 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g 87 F.T.C. 962 (1976), petition for cert. fled, 46
U.S.L.W. 3323, (U.S. Nov. 15, 1977) (No. 77-654).
351. 557 F.2d at 975.
352. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 962, 995 (1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.
1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1977) (No. 77-654). The Second
Circuit's opinion does not indicate the amount of the competing bid, a serious omission
considering that without this figure it is impossible to determine if A & P's description of the
competing bid to Borden was true or false. See note 353 infra.
353. 557 F.2d at 976. These statements were true. The competing bid was $327,000 better than
Borden's bid.
354. Id. Borden's decision is understandable considering that A & P was a major customer of
Borden. A loss of the A & P account would have reduced Borden's gross profit by $1,600,000 and
created substantial excess capacity at Borden's new $5,000,000 plant. 87 F.T.C. at 978.
355. 87 F.T.C. at 1049. A & P requested a letter from Borden stating that its prices were
proportionally available to other buyers. Borden's reply stated only that it felt its prices were legal
and that it was prepared to defend them. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1049-51.
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disclosure ... [would be] contrary to normal business practice and ... public
interest. '358 Such a rule would hinder aggressive bargaining and possibly
"deprive the public of gains that under effective competition it has a right to
expect."
3 5 9
Despite this holding, the FTC found A & P liable under a separate charge
of violating section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act.360 On appeal, A & P
argued that the Borden bid was made to meet competition and that A & P
was unaware that the bid was not within the meeting competition defense. 36 1
In such a case, Automatic Canteen required that A & P could not be found
liable. 362 The Second Circuit rejected this argument as inconsistent with
Kroger. While the bid might have been within the meeting competition
defense from the seller's point of view, 363 it was not within the defense from
the buyer's point of view, since A & P knew that the Borden bid had
substantially beaten the competing bid. 364 The court declined to link Kroger to
affirmative misrepresentations of competing offers, finding the buyer's point
of view rule equally appropriate to a buyer who, like A & P, remains silent on
the terms of competing bids.3 65 In addition, the court found the line between
affirmative misrepresentation, and A & P's statements that Borden was not
"in the ball park" and that a $50,000 reduction "would not be a drop in the
pocket," a "fine one indeed. '366
A & P also argued that a finding of liability under section 2(f) would impose
an affirmative duty to disclose to a seller that its bid had not only met, but
beaten, a competitor's bid, a duty inconsistent with the FTC's dismissal of the
first charge on the ground that such a duty was contrary to the public interest
in vigorous bargaining. 367 The court disposed of this argument by stating that
358. Id. at 1050.
359. Id. at 1051 (quoting 1955 Attorney General's Report, supra note 18, at 196). The FTC
did not conclude that nondisclosure during bargaining was never actionable under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, but only that it was not A & P's responsibility to tell Borden
whether a legal defense was available. Id. at 1051 n.7.
360. Id. at 1051-66.
361. 557 F.2d at 977. A & P also argued that it could not be charged with a knowing
inducement of an illegal price since it felt the bid was cost justified. The court rejected this claim
in light of A & P's trade experience and Borden's statement that the bid was justified only on a
meeting competition defense. Id. at 981. An A & P cost study attempting to establish cost
justification was rejected as defective and inadequate. Id. at 984-85.
362. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); see text accompanying note 331
supra.
363. Unlike the seller in Kroger, Borden was not charged with price discrimination. Thus, it
is uncertain whether Borden could have established a meeting competition defense. The FTC
stated that Borden probably did not have the defense. 87 F.T.C. at 1057 n.19 (dictum).
364. 557 F.2d at 982.
365. Id. at 983.
366. Id. However fine it may be, there is nevertheless a line between the two cases. A & P's
statements, although overstated, were undoubtedly true while Kroger's statements were false. See
notes 352-53 supra.
367. 557 F.2d at 982.
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section 2(f) liability had to be assessed independently of any other statute368
and found that the public interest would be best served by a finding of
liability. 369 Otherwise, large buyers would be permitted to play sellers off
against each other and thereby acquire even greater market power to the
detriment of small buyers. 370 Such tactics, in the court's view, were also likely
to endanger competition among sellers by inducing predatory price cutting. 37 1
C. Analysis of Kroger and A & P
1. The Effect on Competition
a. Primary Line Effects
There would seem to be little doubt that at the primary line Kroger is
anticompetitive. Because the decision discourages aggressive bargaining, an
offsetting force to large, powerful sellers, it thereby encourages price rigidi-
ty. 372 The Kroger court was aware of the anticompetitive potential of section
2(f), but drew the line at lying buyers. 373 From a competitive viewpoint,
however, there is no reason to treat the lying buyer differently from any other
aggressive buyer. In the gypsum industry, the lying buyers undermined the
seller's pricing discipline and initiated a downward trend in prices. 374 Kro-
ger's misrepresentations similarly created uncertainty among sellers, causing
them to reduce their prices. 375 Although one commentator has attempted to
distinguish the lying buyer, in that misrepresentations distort the bargaining
process, 376 such a contention seems misplaced in the rough-and-tumble atmo-
sphere of the marketplace. A bluff is as essential to a shrewd bargainer as it is
to a sharp poker player. Unreliable reports are to be expected in the
marketplace. Indeed, the seller's duty to verify is based on this assumption. 377
368. Id. at 983-84. The court disapproved of charging that the same conduct violated both
§ 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission ACt. Id. The court
overlooked, however, the suggestion in Automatic Canteen that the Robinson-Patman Act is to be
construed in light of other antitrust statutes. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,
73-74 (1953).
369. 557 F.2d at 983.
370. Id. at 982-83.
371. Id. at 983.
372. See 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 63; text accompanying notes 323-26
supra. It should be noted that the sellers in Kroger and A & P were both corporate giants.
Beatrice Foods had annual net sales of approximately $680,000,000 in the fiscal year ending in
February 1965. Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 730 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Kroger Co. v.
FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). In 1970 Borden had net sales of
almost $2,000,000,000. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 962, 964 (1976), aft'd, 557
F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1977) (No.
77-654).
373. See text accompanying notes 336-37 supra.
374. See text accompanying notes 304-05 supra.
375. See R. Posner, supra note 4, at 49.
376. Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1497 n. 118, 1498.
377. See pt. UI(A)(2) supra.
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A fortiori, A & P is also anticompetitive at the primary line. The Second
Circuit ignored the Kroger court's emphasis on misrepresentations and ex-
tended the Kroger rationale to the buyer who "merely keeps quiet about the
nature of the competing bid . ... "378 This extension is questionable
considering that Kroger distinguished the lying buyer from one who fails "to
convey any correct information about the price levels being quoted by
others. '379 The danger in A & P is that the buyer, to avoid liability, must refuse
the seller's bid or at least inform him that his bid has beaten competition.
Ironically, the FTC itself, in dismissing the charge under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, described such an affirmative duty of disclo-
sure as contrary to hard bargaining and the public interest.380 Its character-
ization of the duty as conflicting with "normal business practice" was also
accurate since the buyer and seller are commercial antagonists and "neither
expects the other, or can be expected, to lay all his cards face up on the table.
Battle of wits is the rule.1381 Moreover, the imposition of a duty to disclose
lower bids could induce price matching. By offering'a series of increasing bids
the seller could determine his competitors's price.38 2 Again, price rigidity at
unnecessarily high levels is the result.
Curiously, the A & P court portrayed its decision as procompetitive at the
primary line, since it would discourage predatory pricing. 383 While the court's
concern over this practice is understandable, 38 4 its analysis is suspect. True
predatory pricing is defined as pricing below marginal cost; 385 the court
simply refers to pricing below cost. 38 6 In addition, a prospective predator
378. 557 F.2d at 983.
379. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
380. See text accompanying notes 358-59 supra.
381. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. at 1050 (quoting Forster Mfg. Co. v.
FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 56 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965)).
382. The FTC described this practice as follows: "We fear a scenario where the seller
automatically attaches a meeting competition caveat to every bid. The buyer would then state
whether such bid meets, beats, or loses to another bid. The seller would then submit a second, a
third, and perhaps a fourth bid until finally he is able to ascertain his competitor's bid." 87
F.T.C. at 1051. By encouraging this series of increasing bids A & P distorts the bargaining
process; the seller's normal practice would be to make a series of decreasing offers.
383. 557 F.2d at 983.
384. Predatory pricing occurs when a seller lowers prices below his marginal cost of
production. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 712 (1975). At this point it becomes survival of the financially
fittest. A large firm with strong financial backing may be able to drive a small firm, equally
efficient, out of business. See Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 3, at 175. Commentators have
suggested that a meeting competition defense should not be used to justify pricing below cost.
Areeda & Turner, supra at 715-16; Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 3, at 178 (excepting sellers
with an unsubstantial market share). It will be recalled that the original § 2 of the Clayton Act
was directed at predatory pricing. See note 33 supra.
385. See note 384 supra.
386. 557 F.2d at 982-83; cf. Areeda & Turner, supra note 384, at 699 (footnotes omitted)
("Courts in predatory pricing cases have generally turned to ... empty formulae [such] as 'below
cost' pricing . . . in adjudicating liability. These standards provide little, if any, basis for
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faces substantial obstacles in successfully implementing a predatory pricing
system. 38 7 Thus, predatory pricing can seldom be used profitably and is rarely
seen in practice.388
b. Secondary Line Effects
The effect of the lying or aggressive buyer at the secondary line of
competition is unclear. The aggressive buyer who successfully induces a lower
price from a seller will be in a favored position relative to other buyers. But as
long as all buyers can bargain aggressively and obtain lower prices, no one
buyer would be able to gain a permanent advantage. Theoretically, this
should be the case since the seller's duty under the meeting competition
defense requires him to treat all buyers alike before granting a price cut.
Nevertheless, the large buyer has an inherent advantage because of the
volume of business he generates. The seller has more of an incentive to violate
his duty under the meeting competition defense when dealing with a large
buyer. For example, Borden, the buyer in A & P, was "desperate" to save the
A & P account; its loss would have resulted in a significant loss of revenue.389
Borden probably would not have risked a price discrimination charge if it
were dealing with a "Mom and Pop" store instead of A & P.
Unfortunately, the FTC's arbitrary enforcement policy adds another di-
mension to this problem. Some studies indicate that small businessmen are
most often the target of FTC complaints under the Robinson-Patman Act,390
a policy which increases the large buyer's advantage. As noted above, the
seller is likely to grant discounts to the large aggressive buyer more often
than to the small aggressive buyer. Yet, if the FTC concentrates enforce-
ment on small businessmen, the small aggressive buyer will be unfairly handi-
capped since only he, and not his larger competitor, has to worry about lia-
bility under section 2(f) for high-powered bargaining tactics. 39'
On the other hand, the charge that the FTC concentrates on small
businessmen is questionable, considering the size of the buyers in Kroger and
A & P. 392 If the FTC were to focus more heavily upon larger transactions
analyzing the predatory pricing offense."). Pricing above marginal cost is justified on grounds of
allocative efficiency, since only less efficient firms will drop out of the market. Id. at 711.
Admittedly, the loss of these firms could possibly have an anticompetitive effect. Campbell &
Emanuel, supra note 3, at 135-36.
387. Areeda & Turner, supra note 384, at 698-99. In order for predatory pricing to be
successful the predator must have financial strength superior to his competitors. Id. at 698. There
must also be a substantial prospect that the losses incurred by the predator in driving out his
competitors will be exceeded by the profits earned after they have been eliminated. Id.
388. Id. at 699; Leibler, supra note 6, at 42.
389. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 962, 978 (1976), aff'd, SS7 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.
1977), petition for cert. fled, 46 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1977) (No. 77-654); see note 354
supra.
390. See 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 97-99. This is ironic considering that the
Robinson-Patman Act was designed to protect small businessmen. See note 7 and text accom-
panying notes 31-33 supia.
391. See also Kuenzel & Schiffres, supra note 7, at 1215.
392. In 1970 A & P's net sales amounted to approximately $5,800,000,000. Great Atlantic &
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such as the Beatrice-Kroger and Borden-A & P deals rather than transactions
with "Mom and Pop" stores, or continue not to enforce the Robinson-Patman
Act aggressively, 393 then the large buyer's advantage would, to this extent, be
eliminated. Since the seller's risk of liability for offering a price cut to either a
large or small aggressive buyer would be the same, he would grant lower
prices to both the large and small aggressive buyer. Of course, the impact of
the FTC enforcement policy is reduced somewhat by the ability of private
plaintiffs to asgert Robinson-Patman Act violations.
394
Even if the large buyer has an advantage in obtaining a lower price, the
advantage theoretically would be only temporary. As word of the discount
leaks out, other buyers would press for a similar discount. This would initiate
a series of sporadic price discriminations, 395 eventually resulting in an overall
reduction of prices to buyers. 396 In practice, however, this result has not
always been observed. 397 Thus, in some cases a large buyer may be able to
use his bargaining power to obtain a permanent price advantage over a
smaller competitor.
Assuming, then, that a large buyer can obtain a permanent advantage,
Kroger and A & P would be in the best interest of the small buyer since they
restrict the large buyer's bargaining power. But this does not mean that the
decisions are procompetitive at the secondary line. That question can only be
answered by deciding whether the small buyer's "injury and possible exit from
the market [would have] harm[ed] competition. '398 Such an inquiry would
require a structural analysis of the industries involved, an investigation
beyond the scope of this Comment. 399 Thus, all that can be safely said of
Pacific Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 962, 963 (1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), petitionfor cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1977) (No. 77-654). In 1963" Kroger's net sales were
roughly $2,100,000,000. Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 731 (1976), af'd sub nom. Kroger
Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
393. See R. Posner, supra note 4, at 31-34; Yes, Virginia, There is Still a Robinson-Patman
Act (But Should There Be?), 45 Antitrust L.J. 14, 62-64 (1976).
394. Cf 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 4 ("private suits under Robinson-Patman
appear to have increased"). A private plaintiff injured by a discriminatory price will probably sue
regardless of whether the buyer is small or large.
395. See note 4 supra.
396. Meeting Competition, supra note 3, at 1498.
397. See F. Scherer, supra note 3, at 248-50.
398. Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 3, at 131.
399. "The detrimental effect on competition at the secondary line resulting from a price
discrimination will depend on (1) the competitiveness of the market in which the buyer resells the
product, i.e., the number of buyers who obtain the lower price; (2) the portion of the buyer's total
costs accounted for by the product in question; (3) the resiliency of the disadvantaged buyer's
profit margins; and (4) the importance of the continued existence of the disadvantaged buyer as a
competitive force in the relevant market. Without a thorough study of these factors it is not
possible to predict with any certainty the amount of competitive harm at the secondary line
resulting from a discriminatory pricing system." Id. (quoting Report of the Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Reform of the Robinson-Patman Act 8-9 (1975)).
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Kroger and A & P at the secondary line is that they protect small buyers, but
not necessarily competition. Given this uncertain effect on competition at the
secondary line with the clear anticompetitive effect at the primary line, it is
highly questionable whether the decisions are in the best interests of competi-
tion.
2. Noncompetitive Considerations
Unfortunately, a conclusion that Kroger and A & P are not in the best
interests of competition does not end the analysis of these two decisions. As
long as section 2(f) remains in force, it represents the intent of Congress with
which courts must comply. Both the Kroger and A & P courts justified their
decisions on the ground that a contrary result would have frustrated the intent
of Congress. 40 0 The Kroger court, for example, although cognizant of section
2(f)'s dangers, was forced to draw the line with a lying buyer. To allow a lying
buyer to be immunized by a seller's good faith meeting competition defense
would indeed make a "mockery" of the congressional desire, as reflected in
section 2(f), to restrict the aggressive bargaining tactics of large buyers. 40 '
Thus, Kroger can be viewed as properly decided, despite being anticompeti-
tive, in that a contrary result would have violated congressional intent and
generated disrespect for the law.
Nevertheless, Automatic Canteen points out that section 2(f) can and should
be read narrowly in order to limit its anticompetitive effects. A & P's
imposition of a duty on the buyer to disclose that a seller's bid has beaten
rather than met competition is a significant extension of Kroger and thus
improper. A & P can also be criticized in that it emphasizes the fact that the
seller's bid beat competition. This fact alone does not preclude a meeting
competition defense for the seller. An offer that undercuts competition is
protected by the defense if it was made in good faith. 40 2 Because Automatic
Canteen requires that the buyer know that the price received was actually
illegal, the inquiry should be whether the buyer reasonably thought the seller
was acting in good faith and not whether the bid beat competition. 40 3
VII. CONCLUSION
The Robinson-Patman Act "continues to unfold like an accordion to
produce legal dissonance, antithetical antitrust aberrations, new weird in-
terpretations, and constantly dilating debate."" Interseller price verification
400. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 971, 982 (2d Cir. 1977), petition for
cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1977) (No. 77-654); Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d
1372, 1379 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
401. Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 819 (1969), aff'd sub nor. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438
F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
402. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
403. This test would be inappropriate for the lying buyer since it would allow him to avoid
liability. Thus, for the lying buyer the Kroger rationale should be used.
404. Austern, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive Effect Under Section 2 of the
Clayton Act, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 774 (1968).
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and the Kroger-A & P restriction on robust bargaining are the two latest
aberrations produced by the statute. Both encourage a uniform and rigid price
structure in oligopolistic markets. 40 S Even ignoring its substantial anticom-
petitive effect, interseller price verification is particularly disturbing in that it
is unnecessary. The use of indirect forms of verification 40 6 would eliminate
the need for interseller price verification in many cases. Moreover, the good
faith standard of the meeting competition defense does not require competing
sellers to verify prices with each other. Instead, the seller should be permitted
to lower his price if his good faith investigation of the buyer's report of a
competing price does not indicate good reason to believe that the report is
untrue. 407
Of course, this good faith investigation will not always reveal that a buyer
is misrepresenting a competing price. This does not, however, necessarily
imply that enforcement of section 2(f) should be increased merely because of
its supposed deterrent effect on lying buyers. 408 Section 2(f) has a clear
anticompetitive effect at the primary line, protects, if at all,40 9 only smaller
competitors, and does not necessarily facilitate competition at the secondary
line.410 As such, it is as unattractive as interseller price verification.
In lieu of section 2(f), it is submitted that the good faith element of the
meeting competition defense be emphasized. A seller who can be charged with
knowledge that the buyer's report or a competing price is untrue, and yet still
lowers his price, should not be able to obtain a meeting competition defense.
This should deter the seller from the natural inclination to grant better prices
to large buyers in order to close a large sale. 41 1 Such a solution is preferable to
the use of section 2(f) in that it allows small and large buyers to compete on
equal footing without restricting aggressive bargaining.
Admittedly, even this alternative could be criticized as having some ten-
dency to promote price uniformity in oligopolies. But this necessarily results
from any prohibition of price discrimination. To the extent that a good faith
element restricts the availability of a meeting competition defense, sporadic
price discrimination is inhibited. Nevertheless, the failure to observe the good
faith element of the meeting competition defense would make a "mockery" of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
Underlying this entire discussion is the fundamental question that must be
asked of the Robinson-Patman Act: Is there an alternative method of protect-
ing small buyers that would not harm competition at the primary line? 412 The
Department of Justice's recent study of the Act has observed that "[o]f all the
factors favoring large enterprises, the factor that small businessmen can most
405. See pts. V(BX3), VI(CX1Xa) supra.
406. See pt. M(B) supra.
407. See pt. V(BX2) supra.
408. Sfe text accompanying note 321 supra.
409. See text accompanying notes 392-93 supra.
410. See pt. VI(CX1) supra.
411. See text accompanying note 389 supra.
412. See 1977 Justice Dep't Report, supra note 2, at 7.
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easily counteract is that of quantity and other discounts which can be
achieved through larger scale buying.14 13 The Department of Justice's study
concludes that the formation of buying cooperatives by small buyers could
overcome any advantages in favor of large buyers. 414 Thus, methods of
protecting small buyers, less harmful than the Robinson-Patman Act, would
seem to be available. Of course, until Congress sees fit to modernize this
outdated statute, it can only be hoped that courts will interpret it in the best
interests of competition.
Gerald T. Ford
413. Id. at 247.
414. Id. at 247-48.
